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Abstract of thesis entitled: 
In this thesis, I focus on Walzer's ideas about distributive justice. According to 
Walzer, 'justice,' on the one hand, represents the opposition of 'domination'. On the 
other hand, it is relative to social meanings of goods. The doctrine of 'complex 
equality' is stipulated by Walzer to demonstrate that justice as well as equality is in 
opposition to domination. The doctrine of 'social meanings of goods' is developed to 
give respect to the shared understandings of people. For Walzer, the just distribution 
of a good is simply the distribution in accordance with the good's social meaning. 
Actually, what Walzer wants is, by use of these two doctrines, to establish a benign 
relativist theory of justice. However, these two doctrines of justice are problematic 
and encounter lots of criticisms. Some, like Richard Ameson, criticize that Walzer's 
‘complex equality' is a principle of non-equality and cannot prevent the widespread 
inequalities. Some others，like Amy Gutmann, Brian Barry, and Ronald Dworkin, 
concentrate their criticisms on the shared social meanings of goods. Some of them see 
what Walzer promotes is an unnecessarily restrictive thesis of sphere-specificity. 
Some others criticize that Walzer grounds distributive justice on unreflective 
conventions and overlooks the disagreements over social meanings of goods. In this 
thesis, I will first give a brief summary on Walzer's theory of justice. Then I will 
discuss those criticisms on Walzer's view of justice and Walzer's probable responses 
to these challenges. Finally, I will demonstrate what further problems are left 
unsolved in Walzer's theory and see whether Walzer can go forwards to solve these 
problems. 
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Preface 
Unlike Rawls in A Theory of Justice, Michael Walzer disbelieves that 
universal moral principles can help solve the distributive problems. He holds that 
those invented transcendental moral principles are not something new. They are 
abstract, but they are abstracted from what people in a particular political community 
really share. As Walzer says, “[i]f such a society isn't here --- hidden, as it were, in 
our concepts and categories --- we will never know it concretely or realize it."^ In 
Walzer's view, when we understand deeply what people share in a particular society 
and realize the fact that members of different political communities have different 
shared understandings on social meanings of goods, we will find that the invented 
transcendental principles are not generally available in making moral judgements on 
distributions in different societies. Hence, Walzer tries to ground distributive justice 
on "shared social meanings of goods." He believes that as long as we distribute social 
goods in accordance with their social meanings, this kind of distribution is a just 
distribution and will bring us with "complex equality" or make us free from 
I domination. Therefore, in dealing with the problem of distributive justice, what a 
I philosopher has to do is to interpret to the meanings of social goods shared by his 




When I first read Walzer's Spheres of Justice, Walzer's particular view on 
distributive justice and his approach in doing moral philosophy — the use of a rich 
variety of examples in cultural and historical reference — gave me a deep impression. 
It was interested to know whether Walzer could successfully establish a normative 
theory of justice, which is relativistic in character. However, in my study, I found that 
Walzer's theory of justice encounters lots of challenges and difficulties. In this thesis, 
I shall demonstrate what I discover in this study and try to give my critique on 
Walzer's view of justice. 
Chapter one is an introductory chapter in which I try to give a brief summary on 
Walzer's view of distributive justice. I shall show how Walzer puts those ideas like 
shared social meanings of goods, complex equality, simple equality, autonomy, 
dominance, and so on into a systematic expression. I shall explain what Walzer wants 
to argue for. In my view, Walzer's position is relativist in character and what he holds 
is a nonskeptical moral relativism. 
In the second Chapter, I deal with the doctrine of "complex equality", which is 
the moral ideal pursued by Walzer. I shall discuss Ameson's criticism on this doctrine 
and try to show that this criticism is partial and fails to argue against Walzer's 
"complex equality". Despite of this, it seems to me that there are some other problems 
i 
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concerning the power of the state and democracy that constitute a great challenge to 
the thesis of "complex equality." 
In Chapters Three and Four, I try to discuss the doctrine of "shared social 
meanings of goods，，, the most controversial issue in Walzer's theory of justice. Some 
criticisms on this doctrine focus on the possibility of the restriction on distribution 
given by the social meanings of goods. Amy Gutmaim provides one good argument in 
concerning the influence of the boundary-crossing personal morality on distribution 
and leads Walzer to make concession in his holding. Some other criticisms concern 
the nature of social meanings of goods. Some critics see that the term, "shared social 
meanings of goods" is merely another expression of our conventions or people's false 
consciousnesses. There are some arguments raised by other authors to help Walzer 
fight against above criticisms. However, I don't believe that Walzer, as a relativist, 
will accept these suggestions. For me, it is possible for Walzer to defend against those 
criticisms on the shared social meanings of goods as long as he can establish a 
concrete and convincing thesis of interpretation. 
In Chapter Five, I mainly deal with Walzer's view on interpretation. In order to 
respond to Dworkin and Gutmann's criticism, Walzer seems to make a change in his 
view on the nature of social meanings of goods and the work of interpretation. Shared 
social meanings of goods are not longer some obvious ideas that we can immediately 
V 
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know in interpretation, but some deep accounts of our social life, which we have to 
work out by putting all social factors into consideration and present in a persuasive 
way in a process of interpretation. However, for me, this change raises some problems 
about the source of giving meanings and the relation between what we share and what 
we interpret. For me, Marx's theory of history can help to give a systematic account 
on the historical development of people's shared understandings in a particular society, 
and hence is more comprehensive and attractive than that provided by Walzer. 
Finally, in the chapter of Conclusion, I shall make a brief summary on Walzer's 
approach in dealing with the problem of justice and restate what major problems he 
has to solve if he wants to save his theory form implausibility. 
Although I try to give my criticism on Walzer's theory of justice, I must regard 
that a detailed study on Walzer's writings makes me have a deep and comprehensive 
understanding on the issue of distributive justice. As a Marxist, I agree to some of 
Walzer's ideas that parallel Marx's critique of capitalism. For me, Walzer's theory is 
！ 
problematic not because it is relativistic, but because it is normative. What I am going 
I 
to criticize is Walzer's move to establish a normative theory of justice on the basis of 
'interpretation.' In my view, Marx's theory of history, as it can give a clear account on j . 
I the historical development of people's collective consciousnesses, is more attractive 
i i丨 








distinct exposure on the construction of social meanings of goods. However, if we 
follow Marx's theory of history, which is mainly descriptive and explanatory in 








2 For me, Marx's theory of history just provides us with the material to give critique on "justice" and 
"morality", and hence, is unhelpful to the establishment of a normative theory of justice. My view on 
Marx is greatly under the influence of Wood's writings on Marx, like his Karl Marx (Routiedge and 




This thesis was begun in 1996-1997 during a course on Nozick, Walzer and 
Cohen, conducted by Professor Li Hon-Lam. It was from this course I derived a deep 
comprehension on Walzer's views of justice. I am deeply grateful to Professor Li and 
my schoolmates who took this course and thank for their helpful and valuable 
comments on my course paper, which become the first outline of this thesis. 
Some friends outside Chinese University commented orally of much of the 
material, but I have culpably failed to keep a complete record of their contributions. I 
hope they will forgive me for not listing them here. 
Actually, I owe the greatest debt of gratitude to Professor Li Hon-Lam, my 
supervisor, who read the first draft entirely and made penetrating and excellent 
criticisms. Although I had very right to say what I said, it would have been better had 
I made an argument in response to Li's criticisms. And I have tried to make the 
arguments, though not always at the depth that he (and I) would have liked. 
My parents and Ivy Mark strengthened me with their solidarity, and their 
I wonderful kindness. It is their support, which gives me power to complete thesis. 
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Chapter One: 
Walzer's Theory of Distributive Justice 
A. Walzer's Philosophical Approach 
Since the 1970s, John Rawls，Theory of Justice has revived political philosophy. 
Rawls' liberalism and Robert Nozick's libertarianism brought the question of justice 
back to the centre stage in philosophy. Although their moral standpoints are quite 
different from each other\ they adopt similar approaches in doing philosophy and 
building the theory of justice. What they look for is a general and impartial theory of 
justice, which is ahistorical in nature and is universally applicable. However, in his 
celebrated book, Spheres of Justice, Michael Walzer clearly expresses that his 
approach differs from those found in the universal or transcendental theories of justice. 
Unlike Rawls and Nozick, whose approach is, "to walk out of the cave, leave the city, 
j climb the mountain, fashion for oneself an objective and universal standpoint," 
I Walzer's approach is, "to stand in the cave, in the city, on the ground . . . to interpret to 
one's fellow citizens the world of meanings that we share."^ Instead of searching for 
general or transcendental principles of justice, he aims at interpreting local and 
1 
1 Rawls, tries to find an order between equality and liberty and give particular concern for the needs of 
the "least advantaged" in society, whereas Nozick tries to defend a strong notion of entitlement and 
holds that a just world is one in which everyone had just what they were entitled to, without making 
any sacrifice for the sake of other moral values like equality of share. 
I 2 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, p.xiv. 
1 
particular meanings of justice shared by fellow citizens. This is why he calls himself a 
radical particularist and regards his theory as the pluralism or particularism of history 
and culture. As a critic of universalism and transcendental theory, nevertheless, he is 
not interested in presenting a theory of history on Western culture and traditions from 
which certain criticisms of liberalism and libertarianism in general can be deduced.^ 
Instead, he tries to develop a normative relativist theory and concentrates upon how 
we should understand the goods for which a theory of justice seeks to articulate 
distributive principle. To understand what Walzer says on justice, we must have a 
coherent and consistent comprehension on all those relevant ideas --- like social goods, 
social meanings of goods, shared understandings, common life, monopoly, dominance, 
spheres of distribution, and complex equality. In this chapter, I will try to offer a brief 
and systematic elaboration of Walzer's theory of distributive justice. 
B. Distribution and Social Meanings of Goods 
According to Walzer, people are culture-producing creatures. They come 
together to turn their living place into a society or a political community. They create 
their own particular tradition, culture, religion, and language. They design their life 
3 This point is clearly expressed by Michael Rustin. In his "Equality in Post-Modem Times", (see 
Pluralism, justice’ and Equality, ed. by D. Miller and M. Walzer, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1995’ pp. 17-44), Rustin points out that Walzer's theory is not a theory of history, and all the things 
discussed in Walzer's theory are "widely separated in space and time, ... and are not set in a 
meaningful historical frame." 
2 
and moral value. They are discoverers and inventors of all social goods. From the 
process of social creation, valuation, and conception, goods derive their social 
meanings. Once the social constructions on goods are in place, according to Walzer, 
the understanding of the social meanings of goods has been and will continue to be 
determined by those subjects (creators and users) of the goods. Then, new sets of 
subjects leam the construction and will "respect or revise it with only a minimal 
accommodation of the object.,，* This explains why social meanings of goods are 
shared and commonly adopted by fellow citizens of a political community. 
Once the social meaning of a good is interpreted and accepted, according to 
Walzer, we immediately know the distributive principle of this good and where it 
should be distributed. As said by Walzer, "[i]f we understand what [a good] is, what it 
means to those for whom it is a good, we understand how, by whom, and for what 
reasons it ought to be distributed" and "all distributions are just or unjust relative to 
the social meanings of the goods at stake."^ In other words, it is the social meaning of 
a good that tells us what distributive criterion we should adopt in distributing this 
good. Walzer seems to assume that given a social good, we can find no difficulty in 
understanding its social meaning. Besides, given its social meaning, we can read off 
4 Michael Walzer, 'Objectivity and Social Meaning', in The Quality of Life, ed. By Martha C. 
Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, p. 166. 
5 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, p.9. 
3 
the appropriate distributive principle without much difficulty. 6 For example, money 
and commodities should be distributed in market by means of the free exchange. 
Nobel prizes should be distributed according to desert and jobs should be distributed 
for the most qualified. In other words, distributive criteria of social goods must be in 
accordance with the shared social meanings of goods. 
As a pluralist, Walzer holds that justice is pluralistic in character and the 
principles of justice are themselves pluralistic in form. This is because different social 
goods ought to be distributed for different reasons, through different procedures, by 
different agents and in accordance with their different social meanings. For instance, 
Basic education and education for the professions have different social meanings; and 
also, medical care as a needed good and plastic surgery (when considered as a luxury) 
require different distributive principles. All these differences, for Walzer, are derived 
from different understandings relative to social existings. Therefore, in dealing with 
j the problem of distributive justice, what a philosopher has to do is to develop the 
correct interpretation of social meanings of different goods, rather than to establish 
unachievable transcendental theories of justice. 
We must note that what Walzer insists are "social goods," not private goods. For 
him, all the goods with which distributive justice is concerned are social goods. 
6 I derive this point of view from Professor Li Hon-Lam's paper on Michael Walzer. 
4 
"[These goods] are not and they cannot be idiosyncratically valued" ^ and 
“[(distributive criteria and arrangements are intrinsic not to the good-in-itself but to 
the social good."^ A social good, as it is constructed and conceived in different ways, 
under different conditions and owing to different reasons, will own different meanings. 
For example, a table may become a desk, a workbench, a butcher's block, or an altar. 
Besides, as different societies may have different reasons for producing the same good, 
a good may have different social meanings in different societies. As stated by Walzer, 
"Good in the world have shared meanings because conception 
and creation are social processes. For the same reason, goods have 
different meanings in different societies. The same "thing" is valued for 
different reasons, or it is valued here and disvalued there. 
In addition, social meanings are also historical in character. This means that what 
was just in an earlier society might not be just in a later society, and vice versa. 
"Food," as a social good, may carry different meanings in different places and 
different epochs. For instance, bread can be the staff of life, the body of Christ, the 
symbol of the Sabbath, as well as the means of hospitality.丄。As the social meanings 
of goods are multiple, the distributive criteria, which are determined by the social 
meanings of goods, are multiple too. For this reason, Walzer believes that there is no a 
single set of primary goods conceivable across all moral and material worlds, or else 
7 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, p.9. 
8 ib id . , P . 7 . 
9 i b i d . 
iG i b i d . , P.8. 
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any such set would have to be conceived in terms so abstract that they would be of 
little use in thinking about particular distributions. In addition, any transcendental 
theory relying on such set of primary goods to make moral judgement on distributions 
is unacceptable. 
Furthermore, according to Walzer, any change in the collective consciousness of 
people may lead to a change in the meaning of a social good and its corresponding 
principle of distribution. Take medical care as an example. The shared understanding 
of medical care in Europe during the Middle Ages was quite different from that we 
can find in modem European countries. In medieval Jewish communities, it was 
commonly agreed that the cure of souls was public, but the cure of bodies was private; 
and hence "eternity" was a socially recognized need. On the contrary, in modem 
European countries, the situation is reversed and "longevity", instead of eternity, 
becomes the socially recognized need.^ ^ These two different understandings lead to 
different allocations of medical care. In Europe during the Middle Ages, doctors were 
servants of the rich, often attached to noble houses and royal courts. However, today, 
medical care is always considered as a public provision, which should be distributed 
in proportion to need. 
In Walzer's writings, there are still various examples helping to expose this 
11 ibid., p.87. 
6 
cultural and historical particularism. For example, in ancient India, social meanings 
were integrated and hierarchical, and determined by an overarching religious doctrine 
of ritual purity. Under the domination of this ritual purity, ancient India was a caste 
society and was hierarchical in character. It was this caste system, which passed its 
integrated and hierarchical character to the social meanings of goods. As Walzer holds 
that all distribution is just or unjust relative to the social meanings of the goods in 
question, he seems to agree that the hierarchical and unequal distribution of a good in 
such a caste society is just when this distribution is widely shared and accepted by 
men or women in that society. As he says, “[i]n a society where social meanings are 
integrated and hierarchical, justice will come to the aid of inequality" and "[t]he 
adjective just, applied to this community, rules out all such violations [of the shared 
understandings of fellow Indians]." ^^  For this reason, we have to respect the shared 
social meanings of goods approved by members of one particular society. It would be 
wrong for us to criticize their distribution by using our understandings of the social 
meanings of goods, which are different from theirs. This expression clearly shows that 
there is a significant relativistic strand in Walzer's position. 
For Walzer, the social meanings of goods are shared because they are socially 
12 ibid., p.313. There is no a clear explanation from Walzer on the phrase "to the aid of inequality." 
However, if we take his doctrine of "complex equality"…I will discuss later …into consideration, we 
may find that "inequality" in this passage seems to be the antonym of literal equality, which requires 
the equal share of some primary goods among people. This term is clearly not an opposition to the 
"complex equality." 
7 
created, conceived，and valued. All these processes happen in social constructions. 
And there must be a general agreement to be reached in the social construction or the 
social process of creation, conception, and valuation of a social good. As the social 
meaning of a good rarely comes from vote, people's shared understanding of this 
1 Q 
meaning reflects a fact that "there must be a consensus." In other words, the social 
meaning of a good is shared because it comes form the social construction in which 
the good is created, valued and conceived under the influence of one collective 
consensus. Then how and where does this consensus come from? Walzer's answer is 
very vague. He just says: "Language, history, and culture come together to produce a 
collective consciousness，，and “It is only under the aegis of [culture, religion, and 
politics] that all the other things we need become socially recognized."^^ Then how 
do those things like culture, language, religion, politics and history, come together to 
work out such a consensus or collective consciousness? Walzer says little on this. He 
sees that the social processes or social constructions in which a consensus is actually 
reached are mixed processes involving force and fraud, debate and consent, as well as 
long period of habituations. It is impossible for us to offer a full picture of these 
13 Michael Walzer, 'Objectivity and Social Meaning', in The Quality of Life, ed. By Martha C. 
Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, p. 167. 
14 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983，p.28. 
15 ibid.,p.65. 
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processes because these processes are still mysterious for us.^ ^ 
In spite of these mysterious social processes, for Walzer, it is not difficult for 
us to read off the shared social meanings of good through an empirical investigation 
on cases of distribution or a process of interpretation. In Walzer's points of view, a 
correct interpretation of the social meanings of goods is very important because 
without such a correct interpretation, the contents of arguments on distributive justice 
are empty, and hence no solution can be found in tackling the problem of justice. 
Therefore, the process of interpretation that enables us to have a correct understanding 
of the shared social meanings of goods must practise at first, before social criticisms 
on distributive justice have been made. In addition, for Walzer, the best interpretation 
will make the best social criticism. And what a philosopher should do is not to create 
a non-realistic set of distributive principles, but to work out such correct interpretation 
on shared social meanings of goods. This is why Walzer dislikes general and 
transcendental theories and sees that his philosophical enterprise ‘‘is very different 
fromRawls,s.”i7 . 
c . Monopoly, Domination and Complex Equality 
Then, what is the argument that supports Walzer's view of justice? To understand 
Michael Walzer, ‘Objectivity and Social Meaning', in The Quality of Life, ed. By Martha C. 
Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, p. 167. 
9 
this view clearly, we first have to understand his view on ‘monopoly’，‘dominance，， 
‘social conflict，，'equality', and their relation to social meanings of goods. According 
to Walzer, in a distributive community, there is a variety of social goods such as 
membership, political power, honour, divine grace, commodities, needed goods and 
so on. Each social good owns its particular social meaning, which is different from the 
others. No matter we live in what kind of societies, history tells us that there must be a 
multiplicity of goods with different social meanings, matched by a multiplicity of 
distributive procedures, agents, and criteria. For Walzer, "no full-fledged human 
• • • 1 8 
society has ever avoided the multiplicity." 
As there is a multiplicity of social goods, there is a multiplicity of distributive 
spheres of these goods too. Only within its distributive sphere one good can be 
appropriately distributed. As stated by Walzer, 
"Money is inappropriate in the sphere of ecclesiastical office; it 
is an intrusion from another sphere. And piety should make for no 
advantage in the marketplace, as the marketplace has commonly been 
understood. ... The market is open to all comers; the church is not."^^ 
Since different goods have different social meanings, they have to be distributed 
within different spheres of distribution in accordance with different distributive 
criteria. Taking this view into account, Walzer introduces the doctrine of 'autonomous 
distribution". 
17 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, p.xviii. 
18 Ibid.，p. 4. 
I . j 
10 
I' 
In Walzer's view, the social meaning of a good may automatically provide one 
with a distributive principle of the good. The autonomous distribution of a good is the 
distribution in accordance with this good's social meaning, and is also a just 
distribution. So Walzer says, "when meanings are distinct, distributions must be 
autonomous.”20 In other words, if the distribution of a good violates its social 
meaning, this distribution is not an autonomous or a just one. 
However, the violation of the autonomy of distribution happens quite 
frequently because some groups of men and women always seek to make the good 
they possess the dominant good and try to monopolize this dominant good. For 
Walzer, dominance will be found when one good becomes the dominant good and can 
command a wide range of other goods. However, as no social good can dominate all 
other goods entirely and no full-fledge human society has ever avoided the 
multiplicity of goods, there is no total domination. For example, money is commonly 
regarded as the dominant good in a capitalist society, but even in this society, there are 
still some goods, such as love, punishment, and recognition, that money literally 
cannot buy. Therefore, no dominant good is ever absolutely dominant and no social 
good can dominate the whole range of goods. As long as a social good is distributed 
autonomously within its sphere, monopoly of this good is not something deserving 




our moral concern. In fact, it is usually found that there are different kinds of 
monopoly in different spheres of distribution and each of these monopolies owns its 
special principle of distribution. For example, aristocracy is the principle of 
monopolists of land wealth and familial reputation; divine supremacy is the principle 
of the monopolists of grace and office; meritocracy is the principle of the monopolists 
of education and free exchange is the principle of the monopolists of movable wealth. 
In Walzer's view, as long as each of the monopolized goods is distributed within its 
sphere, monopoly or the distribution in accordance with the monopolist principle is 
not something unjust. As he says, "the principles [of monopolists] are often exactly 
91 
right within the limits of a particular sphere." 
For Walzer, what is unjust is not monopoly within a sphere, but dominance. As 
stated before, the concept of dominance is usually taken to account for the situation in 
which the possession of a social good (the dominant good) can command a range of 
other goods or can help gain access to other goods by crossing the different 
distributive spheres. Moreover, any monopolistic control of a dominant good will 
make a ruling class, whose members stand atop the distributive system. In a society, 
as there is a variety of social goods and distributive spheres, it is possible that there 
are various group of monopolists. These groups such as the monopolists of education 
21 Ibid., p. 12. 
12 
and the monopolists of movable wealth — and others, too, marked off by their 
principles and possession - compete with one another, struggling for supremacy. This 
struggle for supremacy or the struggle for the control of the dominant good, according 
22 
to Walzer, is a distributive struggle, which parallels Marx's theory of class struggle. 
The winner of this struggling or competition is the ruling class and the good, which 
was monopolized by members of this class, will become the dominant good. However, 
the victory of one group does not mean that all other groups will disappear. Other 
groups of monopolists, though they are under the domination of the ruling class, 
remain here and keep on their struggling for supremacy. For Walzer, "supremacy is 
uneasily shared" and "there is no final victory，nor should there be." As there are 
always struggles for supremacy, there are always conflicts among those struggling 
groups. These conflicts are often one of the sources of social conflicts. 
Ideology is created when the ruling class tries to make use of it to 
monopolize the dominant good possessed by them and stabilize their control over 
other classes of people. In other words, the claim to monopolize a dominant good 
constitutes an ideology. This creation, if succeeded, will make those ideologies 
function as magic, and cause people to believe what is false to be true. For example, 
22 What discussed here reveals the quasi-Marxian nature of Walzer's theory. Although Walzer's view 
on autonomy is different from Marx's view about the determination of productive force, he does inherit 
lots of Marx's views found in Marx's early writings. For example, his view about the struggle for 
supremacy is similar to Marx's discussion on class struggle. 
: 23 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, p. 12. 
i 
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when land, religious office, capital, or technical knowledge each trends to be the 
dominant good, aristocracy, divine supremacy, free exchange or meritocracy will each 
be first advocated to become the prevailing principle. That is why Walzer says, 
“History reveals no single dominant goods and no naturally dominant good, but only 
different kinds of magic and competing bands of magicians." ^^  However, as 
mentioned above, the victory of one group of monopolists does not mean that the 
struggle among different groups of monopolists will end forever. As long as different 
groups of monopolists remain here or here is still a class society, the struggles for 
supremacy, which constitutes one source of social conflicts，can never entirely be 
ended. As long as such struggles for supremacy still happen, the ruling class will 
always face resentment and resistance from other classes. It is due to the resentment 
and resistance that dominance is always incomplete and “the rule of every ruling class 
” 25 
is unstable." 
In Walzer's view, any action that struggles for supremacy and dominance is 
unjust. Walzer uses a special term to represent the opposite of domination. It is 
'complex equality'. As he says, “The regime of complex equality is the opposite of 
tyranny.，, 26 Here, the term ‘equality, owns its special meaning and function. 
‘Equality, in Walzer's use is quite different from its literal meaning. It is not a demand 
24 Ibid., p. 11. 
25 Ibid., p. 11. 
14 
of equal share or equal distribution. It does not play the role of a positive political 
ideal In contrast to this view, the term 'simple equality' represents equality in its 
literal meaning. For Walzer, the "regime of simple equality' is a society in which 
every citizen has the equal share of some primary social goods such as money. 
However, this regime cannot last for long because the further process of conversion 
such as free exchange in the market will bring about inequalities. The requirement of 
a periodic return to the original condition of equality invites continual state 
intervention. Nevertheless, this continual invitation of state intervention gives the 
authority of redistribution to the state and allows the use of political power to gain 
access to other goods. After then, state power itself will become the target of 
competitive struggles. People of different classes will seek to take state power in hand 
and monopolize its use to enforce their control of other social goods and their 
domination over other groups of people. This domination implies another inequality, 
the inequality of status — some groups of people become superior and dominant; 
some other groups become subordinate and being dominated. The elimination of this 
inequality or domination is what every egalitarian pursues, but those simple 
egalitarians' suggestions fail to achieve this goal. All these explain why a society of 
literal equals is not a lively possibility, and "equality literally understood is an ideal 
26 Ibid., p. 19. 
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ripe for betrayal. 
What discussed above reminds us of Robert Nozick's "Wilt Chamberlain" 
argument against any principle of patterned distribution. In his argument, Nozick tries 
to show that continuous maintenance of equality or any pattern of distribution is 
morally unacceptable because such maintenance would require continuous and 
unjustifiable interference with individual liberty and self-ownership.^^ In company 
with Nozick, Walzer sees that the requirement of state intervention is unacceptable 
because this will finally lead to the tyrannical use of political power. Despite this 
similarity, Walzer and Nozick actually hold different positions in dealing with the 
problems of justice. Nozick's libertarian doctrine of inviolable individual rights and 
his objection to welfare system are what Walzer disagrees with. In Walzer's view, any 
public arrangement or distribution of a good is morally allowed when it conforms to 
people's shared understanding of the good embodied in the appropriate distributive 
sphere. 
If equality in literal meaning is not available, then what is the correct function 
of the term 'equality'? In Walzer's view, ‘equality, should be negative in meaning. 
And the appropriate use of this term is to make it run a negative function to oppose 
* Ibid., p. xi. 
•s A detailed demonstration on the "Wilt Chamberlain" argument and Nozick's objection to the 
enforcement of patterned principles of distribution can be found in Nozick's Anarchv, State, Utopia 
(Blackwell. 1974), pp. 155-164. ‘ 
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dominance. As stated by Walzer, "The root meaning of equality is negative" and "the 
aim of political egalitarianism is a society free from domination." "Complex 
equality" is the equality used in this sense. Walzer regards that he is inspired by 
Pascal and Marx to work out the doctrine of complex equality. As stated by Pascal, 
The nature of tyranny is to desire power over the whole world 
and outside its own sphere. 
There are different companies ~ the strong, the handsome, the 
intelligent, the devout -- and each man reigns in his own, not 
elsewhere.... 
Tyranny. The following statements ... are false and tyrannical: 
"Because I am handsome, so I should command respect." "I am strong, 
therefore men should love me...." "I am ... et cetera." 
Tyranny is the wish to obtain by one means what can only be 
had by another. We owe different duties to different qualities: love 
is the proper response to charm, fear to strength, and belief to 
learning. 30 
Marx holds a similar view: 
"Let us assume man to be man, and his relation to the world to be a 
human one. Then love can only be exchanged for love, trust for trust, 
etc. If you wish to enjoy art you must be an artistically cultivated 
person; if you wish to influence other people, you must be a person 
who really has a stimulated and encouraging effect upon others.... If 
you love without evoking love in return, i.e., if you are not able, by the 
manifestation of yourself as a loving person, to make yourself a 
beloved person -- then your love is impotent and a misfortune.^ ^  
Endorsing Pascal's and Marx's views Walzer claims that only "complex 
equality" can free a society from domination. He articulates such a principle of 
29 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, p. xii — xiii. 
30 Blaise Pascal, The Pensees, trans. J.M. Cohen, Hammondsworth, England, 1961, p. 96. 
31 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, in Early Writings, ed. T.B. Bottomore, 
London, 1963, pp. 193-94. 
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complex equality as the following: “No social good x should be distributed to men 
and women who possess some other good y merely because they possess y and 
without regard to the meaning of x. In the regime of complex equality, for Walzer, 
different social goods are distributed in according to different distributive criteria and 
no a particular good is generally convertible. As different social goods may be 
monopolistically held in its field, there will be many small inequalities. However, so 
long as the conversion of particular goods is prohibited and each social good is 
distributed autonomously within it sphere, inequality will not be multiplied through 
the process of conversion. In addition, as there is no conversion of particular goods, 
every social good is restricted to where it belongs, and hence no good has the chance 
to become dominant good. Above all, as no one can convert his/her advantage from 
one sphere into another, Walzer believes, no one can become the all-rounds winner; 
and hence, no one can dominate others by use of dominant good. In the regime of 
"complex equality," dominance becomes impossible; the social meanings of goods 
are under protection, and hence, no injustice will be found in the distribution of 
goods. 
32 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, pp. 17-20. 
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D. Relativist Theory of Justice and Democratic Socialism 
Actually, what Walzer wants to establish is a normative theory of justice. 
'Justice' in Walzer's theory can be expressed in two aspects. On the one hand, justice 
is relative to social meaning and requires men and women to live in a way faithful to 
the shared social meanings of goods or the shared understandings of their fellow 
citizens. In other words, if the distribution of a good violates its social meaning, then 
it is not a just distribution. On the other hand, the term "justice" is used in a negative 
sense and expresses its opposition to any dominant distribution or tyranny. This view 
is obviously expressed in the doctrine of complex equality. According to this doctrine, 
provided that the distribution of a good is in accordance with its social meaning, no 
good will become dominant and this distribution is a just distribution. These two 
senses of "justice" are closely related to each other and are linked together by "the 
shared social meanings of goods." Here what Walzer holds is obviously a relativist 
theory of justice, which is nonskeptical in character.�] It tries to offer moral basis 
upon which we can clarify just and unjust distributive behaviours. According to this 
relativist moral view, moral standards are multiple in character and only people's 
shared understandings can provide a substantive account of moral motivation, in 
33 In Spheres of Justice, Walzer seems not to regards his theory as a relativist theory. But in his recent 
book, Thick and Thin, Walzer clearly expresses that the maxims he holds are "relativist maxims. T.M. 
Scanlon gives a brilliant account on Walzer's benign relativism in chapter eight of his book, What We 
Owe to Each Other, especially from page 333 to page 338. 
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comparison with which more universal demands seem implausibly abstract. Besides, 
Walzer makes this claim because he disbelieves that people can successfully transcend 
their traditions, culture, and shared understandings on social meanings of goods to 
make any moral judgment. Walzer worries that this attempt of transcendence will 
bring us to overemphasize the superiority of our culture and give no respect to other 
cultures. For Walzer, this kind of respect is needed when we understand the fact that 
each good can have different meanings in different societies and what people socially 
share provides the source for distributive justice. So he says, "Mutual respect and a 
shared self-respect are the deep strengths of complex equality, and together they are 
the source of its possible endurance.”34 
Apart from the moral relativism, Walzer seems to hold the democratic 
socialism. In the final chapter of his Spheres of Justice, Walzer says roughly as 
following: 
"The appropriate arrangements in our own society are those, I 
think, of a decentralized democratic socialism; a strong welfare state run, 
in part at least, by local and amateur officials; a constrained market; an 
open and demystified civil service; independent public schools; the 
sharing of hard work and free time; the protection of religious and 
familial life; a system of public honouring and dishonouring free from 
all considerations of rank or class; workers' control of companies and 
factories; a politics of parties, movements, meetings, and public 
debate.，，35 
However, in Spheres and his other writings, Walzer rarely gives any detailed 
34 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, p. 321. 
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explanation on why he holds this position. One possible explanation is that he 
believes that those arrangements described in the quoted passage reveal the correct 
interpretation of the shared social meanings of goods in our society. These shared 
social meanings of goods are usually distorted by prevailing "shallow and partisan 
accounts" of our social life. These shallow accounts are in favour of capitalism and 
support plutocracy, the power to command other goods by use of money. The 
democratic socialism, on the contrary, expresses its opposition to the plutocracy and 
the dominance of money, and hence read off the genuine shared understandings of 
people. 
Then what is the relation between this democratic socialism and Walzer's 
relativism? Are they incompatible? For Walzer, it is not possible for this ideal society 
to be established until people in this society have shared this ideal. As Walzer says, 
"institutions of this sort are of little use unless they are inhabited by men and women 
who feel at home with them and are prepared to defend them."^^ What was discussed 
above shows that any arrangement or distribution in a society must be (a) in 
accordance with the shared social meanings of goods and (b) commonly endorsed by 
the fellow citizens. It is the "shared social meaning of a good" links Walzer's 
relativism and his democratic socialism together. As goods in the democratic socialist 
35 ibid., p. 318 
36 ibid., 
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society are still distributed in accordance with different shared social meanings of 
goods，justice is still pluralistic and relativistic in character. For this reason, Walzer's 
democratic socialism is not incompatible with his moral relativism. 
What demonstrated above is a brief account on Walzer's view on distributive 
justice. From this account, you may find that ‘the social meanings of goods' and 
'complex equality' are two leading categories in Walzer's theory of justice. Actually, 
they are also two most controversial doctrines that accompany lots of criticisms. In 
the forthcoming chapters, I will focus on some famous criticisms on these two 




A. Arneson on Walzer's Criticism of Simple Equality 
Walzer launches the principle of "complex equality" and uses it as the standard 
of justice partly because he does not trust the realizability of the "literal equality" or 
"simple equality" held by traditional egalitarians. He disbelieves that we can achieve 
the literal equality through the unconditional application of the approach, suggested 
by those simple egalitarians, to distribute goods equally in accordance with the 
general principle of equality. He also holds that the pursuit of simple equality is 
helpless and hopeless in preventing and resisting domination or tyranny. On the 
contrary, some egalitarians, like Richard J Ameson, disagree to Walzer's view on 
simple equality. 
As mentioned in Chapter One, those critics of literal equality, like Nozick and 
Walzer, do worry that the continuous maintenance of literal equality will bring about 
the unjustifiable interference with individual liberty or the tyrannical use of political 
power. And this anxiety reveals that there are some other moral values, such as 
self-ownership or 'complex equality，，which are not inferior to the equality in its 
literal meaning. 
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For Ameson, Walzer's opposition to any variety of literal equality is only an 
objection against an extreme doctrine of equality "which holds that it is of overriding 
moral importance that the distribution of socially valued goods must be exactly equal 
in some crucial respect" and gives literal equality a superior moral status in 
comparison with other moral values. However, this challenge is not strong enough to 
make us give up the pursuit of literal equality. For him, the lack of appeal of extreme 
egalitarianism might not plausibly support a sweeping rejection of equality literally 
construed. It does not bother us with this problem as long as we turn to accept a 
moderate doctrine of literal equality, which gives equal concern to other moral values. 
This moderate doctrine of literal equality holds that (a) small deviations from 
equality, below a threshold, do not matter morally, (b) above the threshold, 
inequalities should be reduced, ceteris paribus, but (c) equality does not trump all 
other moral concerns and must be balanced sensibly against competing values.^^ In 
brief, when there is a conflict between literal equality and other values, a moderate 
egalitarian will make moderation over the degree of equality or scarify equality to 
some extent in order to avoid such a conflict. And "the more a doctrine of equality 
tends towards moderation, the less severe will be the conflict between maintenance of 
Richard Araeson, 'Against Complex Equality', in Pluralism, justice, and Equality, ed. by D. Miller 
and M. Walzer, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, p. 230. 
38 Ibid.; p. 230. 
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an acceptable degree of equality and preservation of desirable individual freedom." 
Provided that people voluntary accept the reasonable degree of equality, there is no 
forced intervention to be found. 
Nevertheless, Ameson's doctrine of moderate equality is also problematic. 
Firstly, it seems to me that the conditions (a) and (b) in Arneson's setting are very 
obscure. As the various worthwhile equalities may be incommensurable, it is doubtful 
that the we can find out the exact size of the pattern below and above the threshold. 
How much degree of moderation is reasonable and acceptable? To what extent of 
moderation will make people accept the moderate equality voluntary? And what are 
the reasons that drive people to accept such a moderate equality? If we have to 
moderate or sacrifice equality to a large extent in order to promote rival values such 
as social utility and individual liberty, can we still regard that this sacrifice is what a 
literal egalitarian pursues? Isn't this sacrifice equal to the abandonment of literal 
equality? Besides, Ameson's assumption (C) is problematic too. What matters is not 
whether equality should trump all other moral concerns, but in what way we can solve 
the conflict between literal equality and other moral values. In a society, different 
classes of people, owing to their different social status and different self-interests, 
may disagree with each other about the amount that deviates from equality. Then how 
39 Richard Ameson, 'Against Complex Equality', in Pluralism，justice，and Equality, ed. by D. Miller 
and M. Walzer, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, p.230. 
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can we solve these conflicting disagreements? 
Instead of answering above questions, Ameson believes that there will be a 
society, in which people does care about equality and will voluntary accept any kind 
of equal distribution. As he says, "if there is a consensus in society that equality is 
morally valuable, reasonable restrictions on citizens' freedom in order to preserve 
equality will not be experienced as o n e r o u s . T h i s belief recalls G. A. Cohen's 
argument against Nozick's self-ownership and traditional Marxist view on equality."^ ^ 
B. Cohen's "Voluntary Equality" — A Defence of Literal Equality 
According to Cohen, a Marxist must also be an egalitarian and objects any kind 
of capitalist exploitation, which is rooted in an unequal distribution of rights in 
external resources. This opposition is also an opposition to the thesis of 
self-ownership, which is in support of the inequality of condition in order to preserve 
the inviolable individual liberty or the right of self-ownership. On the other hand, the 
Marxist critique of capitalism seems to affirm the principle of self-ownership. 
According to Marxists, capitalism is unjust because in a capitalist society, workers' 
labour-time is extracted and is stolen by capitalists in production after a 'just' 
40Richard Ameson, 'Against Complex Equality', in Pluralism, justice, and Equality, ed. by D. Miller 
and M. Walzer, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, p.231. 
41 A detailed argument is given in Cohen's book, Self-Ownership, Freedom，and Equality 
(Cambridge University Press, 1995.) 
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agreement has been reached. And this labour-theft objection implies that the worker is 
the proper owner of his labour-time and "surplus value," and this, nonetheless, affirms 
the self-ownership thesis. However, this affirmation brings Marxists to face a 
dilemma because the affirmation of the principle of self-ownership, coupled with 
unequal distribution of resources and talents, will produce unequal distribution of 
income and wealth. 
For Cohen, Marx designs an ideal society, the higher phase of the communist 
society, in which the dilemma can be transcended. This society is a society with an 
overflowing abundance which "renders it unnecessary to press the talent of the 
naturally better endowed into the service of the poorly endowed for the sake of 
establishing equality of condition, and it is therefore unnecessary to trench against or 
modify self-ownership, in order to achieve that equality. In this society, abundant 
productive resources are available to all people, and a man can effectively be the 
sovereign over himself. However, Cohen points out that it is no longer realistic to 
design a society like that in the pre-green fashion, especially when we are more 
concerned about the ecological crisis. Even though this ideal society with abundant 
productive resources is a Utopia, Cohen does not hold that the Marxist dilemma 
cannot be transcended. Instead, Cohen tries to project a solution to show how 
42 G.A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 16 or 
p. 122. 
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'voluntary literal equality' can be sought in a society with less abundance of external 
resources. 
In Cohen's opinion, even though conflicts of interest still persist, in a society 
whose level of material abundance falls short of the limitless conflict-dissolving 
abundance of communism, it is still possible that such a level is abundant enough to 
resolve those conflicts without the exercise of coercion. Besides, Cohen also believes 
that, despite the substantial conflicts of interests, in the society with modest 
abundance of external resources, people will become rational and moral enough to 
deal with those conflicts and are able to handle them with mutual forbearance when 
they need not make considerable self-sacrifice. Therefore, even though there is a law 
with penalties to guarantee equal distribution, as everyone in that society believes that 
following such a law can fulfil their equality-seeking obligation, they will not feel 
they are forced to follow such a law. 
In company with Cohen, Ameson sees that in such a society of 'voluntary 
equality', equality in literal sense will be conceived as a public good and people in 
that society "will not mind the restrictions on their liberty that are necessary in order 
to preserve a valued egalitarian condit ion.Besides, as people do care about 
equality and are willing to accept any equal redistribution, there is no forced 
43Richard Ameson, 'Against Complex Equality', in Pluralism, justice, and Equality, ed. by D. Miller 
and M. Walzer, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, p.230. 
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rearrangement and domination. In addition, as people in such a society are rational 
and moral enough to hold the equality-seeking obligation, they will not accept any 
kind of domination, which may violate the equality of condition. Therefore, what an 
egalitarian has to do is to develop a theory of equality to make people rationally 
accept the equality-seeking obligation. As he says, "[e]galitarians do not propose to 
institute a regime of equality in a society where people both care nothing for equality 
and judge it to be of little moral value." 44 Under this consideration, Ameson sees 
that Walzer's principle of complex equality, which allows different inequalities in 
different distributive spheres, is to "refurbish the ideal of equality by redefining i t" 
However, so doing, for Ameson, is only to shift the ground of debate and is unhelpful 
by solving the problem of widespread inequalities. 
Does this criticism successfully argue against Walzer's objection to simple 
equality? I don't think so. For me, there are still lots of problems found in Cohen's 
thesis of "voluntary equality." Before going to discuss these problems, let us first give 
an account on Marx's view on 'equal right' or 'literal equality' In "Critique of the 
Gotha Program", Marx say: 
[E]qual right is here still — in principle — a bourgeois right. 
The right of the producers is proportional to the labour they do; the 
equality consists in the fact that measurement is by the same standard, 
labour. One person, however, may be physically and intellectually superior 
to another and thus be able to do more labour in the same space of time or 
44 ibid.,p.231. 
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work for a longer period. To serve as a measure labour must therefore be 
determined by duration or intensity, otherwise it ceases to be a standard. 
This equal right is an unequal right for unequal labour. 
This right is thus in its content of inequality, just like any other right. 
A right can be its nature only consist in the application of an equal 
standard, but unequal individuals can only be measure by the same 
standard if they are looked at from the same aspect, if they are grasped 
from on particular side, e.g., if in the present case they are regarded only 
as workers and nothing else is seen in them, everything else is ignored. 
Further: one worker is married, another is not; one has more children than 
another, etc;, thus, with the same work performance and hence the same 
share of the social consumption fund, one will in fact be receiving more 
than another, one will be richer than another, etc. If all these defects were 
to be avoided rights would have to be unequal rather than equa l . 
What I understand from this passage about "equality" is that Marx disbelieves that the 
equality of right or the literal equality is a lively possibility. Marx seems to adopt a 
critical attitude towards the 'notion of equal right' and wants to reject this notion, 
rather than to present a goal in cherishing this literal equality. Actually, the term 
"equality" can be interpreted in two different aspects. On the one hand, it can be 
identified as a literal egalitarian's demand on the equal distribution of wealth. On the 
other hand, it can be treated as an aversion to exploitation and the getting of autonomy 
or freedom. The goal to pursue the equal share of wealth or the equal distribution of 
means of lives is put into consideration when some want to find out a fair way to deal 
with scarcity. However, under the demand of this kind of distribution, some better off 
in the society have to sacrifice certain amount of gain in order to maintain that 
45 Karl Marx, Critique of the Goth a Program, in Marx Selection, ed. By Allen Wood, Macmillan, 
New York, 1988, pp. 188-189. 
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‘equality.，However, in the higher phase of communist society, which is characterized 
by the slogan "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need," 
situation is quite different from that mentioned above. “It does not treat people 
equally from any point of view, but instead considers people individually each with a 
different set of need and abilities."46 This kind of society can only exist when "equal 
share" as a device for distributing scarce resources will no longer be needed because 
in such a society, the springs of co-operative wealth flow abundantly enough to permit 
everyone's need to be fully satisfied. Equality, in this society, is regarded as the goal 
to be free from domination. This goal, or this kind of equality, is what Marx pursues. 
What I mentioned above are two different goals to be pursued in two different 
societies, though both are expressed in the term, 'equality.' Cohen seems not to make 
any distinction of these two different goals and wrongly treats them as the same one 
pursued by Marx. Actually, what Marx pursues is human emancipation or to build a 
society free from oppression and exploitation. This view parallels Walzer's objection 
to tyranny and domination. 
Besides, for Cohen and Ameson, the society-wide voluntary equality is possible 
when people act from a belief in egalitarian justice which, material conditions being 
favourable, demands only some and not a heroic sacrifice of their self-regarding 
46 Allen Wood, "Marx and Equality", in Analytical Marxism, ed. by John Roemer, Cambridge 
University Press, 1986, p. 296. 
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interests. Although Cohen claims that in conditions of modest abundance, people are 
willing to observe the dictates of egalitarian justice, he talks little about where such 
'belief and ‘will’ come from and what will make such 'belief' become true. It seems 
to me that what these literal egalitarians advocate is an impartial moral principle — the 
principle of literal equality - that every rational person would be willing to hold 
without opposition. However, they rarely offer a detailed explanation of why 
'egalitarian justice' is the best political morality that everyone has to pursue. They 
seem to take this justice as something self-evident. Of course, we may agree that 
social goals can be set to eliminate misery and poverty, if this elimination is 
commonly shared in our society. However, this does not mean that we are willing to 
accept literal egalitarian justice. Actually, when we talk about those factors, which 
affect people's belief, and will, we must not ignore the power of personal interests and 
socially shared understandings. 
In addition, there is some doubt about the material possibility of the "good 
society" projected by Cohen. It seems to me that in this projection, Cohen's 
explanation in those terms like "conditions of modest abundance" and "material 
conditions being favourable" is very vague. It is still unclear for us what kind of 
society is the ideal society projected by those literal egalitarians. 
Taking all these challenges into account, should we rely on this self-evident 
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theory of voluntary equality to defend against Walzer's criticism on literal equality? 
The answer is obviously negative. In my view, if Arneson wants to argue against 
Walzer's criticism, he must first develop a subtle and convincing theory of literal 
equality. 
C. Arneson's Criticism on Walzer's Complex Equality 
Instead of providing a theory to prove that literal equality is morally worth 
pursuing, Arneson turns to argue against Walzer's complex equality. The first 
criticism is that Walzer's theory is not really an egalitarian's theory, but a theory of 
non-equality. For Arneson, Walzer, who regards himself as an egalitarian, does 
overlook the value of equality, or even tries to promote the widespread inequalities. 
In Arneson's view, in order to prevent the emerge of dominance, Walzer allows the 
extreme inequality to happen in every distributive sphere and holds that "literal 
equality or equality of condition does not matter morally, or matters hardly at all in 
comparison to the goal of eliminating domination. Actually, in Spheres of Justice, 
Walzer makes a similar claim. According to Walzer, it does not matter that there is no 
equal distribution of money, or that someone has a yacht and an expensive car, but I 
do not have any, as long as everyone is complex-equal. As he says: “[0]nce we have 
47 Richard Arneson, 'Against Complex Equality', in Pluralism, justice, and Equality, ed. by D. Miller 
and M. Walzer, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, p. 232. 
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blocked every wrongful exchange . . . I t just doesn't matter, from the standpoint of 
complex equality, that you have a yacht and I don't . . .So long as yachts ... have only 
use value and individualized symbolic value, their unequal distribution doesn't 
matter.,，48 However, Ameson disagrees to this view. For him, we intuitionally oppose 
to those vast inequalities happening in different distributive spheres and Walzer's 
doctrine of complex equality seems rarely to offer any reason to explain why these 
vast inequalities does not matter morally. Therefore, according to Arneson, Walzer's 
theory is not an egalitarian theory, but a theory of inequality. Besides，"complex 
equality", promoted by Walzer, is misdescribed as any sort of equality. 
What response can Walzer give to this challenge? In his paper, "Response", 
Walzer does not give a direct response to Ameson's criticism. He just says, "in a 
sense, of course, this is true (and acknowledged): complex equality is a version of 
equality.，,49 But obviously, this response is not detailed and clear enough to object to 
Ameson's criticism. In my view, in helping Walzer answer Ameson's criticism, we 
have to distinguish two senses of equality. As already mentioned in last section, 
'equality' sometimes may be regarded as a demand on the equal distribution of wealth 
in conditions of material scarcity. This is so-called 'literal equality' in Walzer and 
Arneson’s term. But sometimes, 'equality' may be treated as an aversion to 
48 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983’ pp. 107-8. 
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domination or as an abbreviation of Marx's famous slogan: "from each according to 
his ability, to each according to his need." In fact, these two demands are always in 
conflict with each other. This conflict has been already mentioned in Walzer's 
demonstration about the relation between the pursuit of simple equality and the 
existence of state tyranny.^^ So if one holds these two conflicting demands as his 
ideals, he is going to face a dilemma, just like the dilemma encountered by Marxists 
in Cohen's demonstration. One way to solve this dilemma is to give up one of these 
two demands and explain why the demand he holds is worth pursuing. This is the 
position that Walzer holds in Spheres of Justice when he stipulates the thesis of 
'complex equality' against the thesis of "simple equality'. 
Then how can Arneson, as a literal egalitarian, solve this dilemma? If he wants to 
show Walzer's view on equality is false, one thing that he has to do is to prove that 
the demand of 'literal equality' is more worth pursuing than the demand of autonomy 
or non-dominance. Another way is to claim that there exists no conflict between the 
above two demands and an egalitarian can hold these two ideals without facing a 
dilemma. It seems to me that Arneson, in his essay, rarely provides any good 
argument in these two aspects, and this deficiency greatly weakens the power of his 
arguments against Walzer's claim of complex-equality. 
49 Michael Walzer, 'Response', in Pluralism, justice, and Equality, ed. by D. Miller and M. Walzer, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995，p. 283. 
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Ameson's another complaint on Walzer's doctrine of complex equality is that 
Walzer overlooks the possibility that "inequalities will be 'summed' across different 
goods.，’5i For Ameson, 
"It is compatible with the definition of autonomous distribution that 
the distribution of goods in a society is fully autonomous, so the 
complex equality fully obtains, yet the same individuals always fall at 
the top end and bottom end of the distributional profile in every single 
sphere. Complex equality is also compatible with the supposition that 
the spread between the top and bottom of the distributional profile in 
every sphere is enormous. Winners win big, and losers get small crumbs, 
in each autonomous distribution, and furthermore the same individuals 
can be the winners and losers in every separate sphere." 
In Ameson's view, the complex equality, in practice, cannot eliminate the widespread 
inequalities because the autonomous criteria of distribution will tend to favour the 
same individual in each sphere. In other words, for Ameson, complex equality is not 
helpful in diminishing the power of the dominant good such as money because "the 
autonomous criteria of distribution will tend to favour the same individuals in each 
sphere.’，53 So people, especially those losers or worse off, in such a society are still 
not equal in share and treatment. And it does matter for us not to overlook this kind of 
inequality. 
Walzer only gives a rough response to this challenge in his 'Response'. 
According to Walzer, there is no injustice in the actual distributions for all the 
5° See Chapter One, p. 15. 
51 Richard Ameson, 'Against Complex Equality', in Pluralism, justice, and Equality, ed. by D. Miller 
and M. Walzer, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, p.234. 
52 ibid., p. 233 
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available goods are distributed to men and women who possess the appropriate 
qualities or who have performed in the appropriate ways.54 What is unjust is the 
process in which some groups of men and women command a wide (or full) range of 
other goods by use of the good they possess. However, this argument is not strong 
enough to argue against Ameson's challenge. If Walzer wants to convince Ameson, 
he has to give a more detailed explanation on this view. Actually, I do not think it is 
difficult for Walzer to offer a good response to Ameson's criticism. In Walzer's 
formulation, in some spheres, like the market, it is possible that some people will fall 
at the bottom. But this does not mean that this case will happen in all spheres. For 
example, a man is a successful businessman, but this success may not bring him to be 
a successful doctor. Even if he is also a successful doctor, but his success in this field 
is by no means caused by his success in business. As he states in Spheres of Justice: 
“Nor can [everyone] be successful in every distributive sphere, for there are some 
spheres to which the idea of success doesn't pertain."^^ For example, in the sphere of 
friendship or the sphere of love, no one would want to (or should) treat these goods as 
the goods sold in market or as the needy goods, which should be allocated by the 
government to everyone. Even though there is inequality in the spheres of love and 
friendship, this kind of inequality is quite different from the inequality found in 
53 ibid., p.234. 
54 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, p.290. 
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market. No inequality in one sphere will bring its influence to another sphere if we 
understand the social meaning of each goods and prohibit the general conversion of 
different goods. 
In addition, in the field of welfare, for instance, it is difficult for us to find any 
winner and loser.^^ Since everyone has access to welfare and other goods that they 
need, the poor cannot be too poor; by the same logic, the rich are not that rich. This 
is why Walzer favours the increase of different kinds of social goods. As a result, 
when the number of social goods and distributive spheres increases, it becomes more 
and more difficult for one good to become the dominant good and the winner in one 
sphere to become the winner in all spheres. As the possibility of the domination of 
one good becomes smaller and smaller, it is possible for every member to possess 
different goods. Helping Walzer to elaborate this view, Miller claims that: "When 
different people in one society succeed in different spheres, their relationships overall 
can manifest a certain kind of equality. ... The more spheres there are, the better the 
chance any given person has of enjoying the experience o f ' r u l i n g ' . A s a result，no 
one in such a society is an overall winner or an overall loser; no rich man and woman 
will “ 'grind the faces of the poor,' impose their poverty upon them, [and] command 
55 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, p. 20. 
56 For me, even though there exists such a distinction, the distinction is by no mean obvious. 
From Hon-Lam Li's paper on Michael Walzer. 
58 David Miller, 'Introduction', 'm Pluralism, justice, and Equality, ed. by D. Miller and M. Walzer, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, p.l2. ‘ 
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their deferential behaviour"^^ Hence, no one will feel inferior or superior than other, 
and above all, no one will feel he or she is under others' control or domination in all 
spheres when she/he loses only in one sphere. 
Although what matters morally in Walzer's theory of complex equality is the 
goal of eliminating domination, this doesn't mean that Walzer doesn't care about the 
extreme literal inequalities within spheres. For him, the most appropriate way to 
weaken the degree of inequality is to increase the number of social goods with 
different social meanings and in demand of different forms of distribution. This 
increase will not only greatly diminish the power of a probable dominant good, but 
also to some extent moderate inequalities in different spheres. For example, the 
application of the principle of free exchange leads to inequality in the market, but the 
degree of inequality will be greatly diminished when more and more goods cannot be 
purchased in the market. For this reason, Walzer says, "[t]he point that I want to make 
(against Ameson) is that this particular inequality really did mean less when some of 
the things that money once brought were decisively cut off."^^ 
Some like Ameson might still argue that the loss in one sphere may bring its 
effect into other spheres.^^ But for Walzer, the distributional autonomy in each sphere 
59 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983，p.xii. 
Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, p.286 
61 For example, as asked by Ameson, "[Is] possession of the wherewithal for educational success 
correlated with possession of traits that make for high income and wealth, the ability to attract 
desireable romantic and marital partners, stable good health and avoidance of disability, a gratifying 
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of social goods and the resistance to convertibility would be maintained, not only by 
the state, but also in large degree, by ordinary men and women within their own 
spheres. If romantic or marital partners choose their partners not according to the 
criterion of love, but to the criterion used in market and under the attractness of 
money, they will never get the real love. Therefore, we are the decider of whether we 
should bring the effect of success and failure from one field to another field, not the 
other authority. If we don't accept this convertibility and we understand this kind of 
conversion is unjust, then, for Walzer, why must we worry about the possibility that 
inequalities will be “ 'summed' across different good"? And it is in the demand of 
living without domination that Walzer thinks members of one society will resist any 
action to bring the influence of inequality in one sphere to another sphere. 
As mentioned above, the existence of the needed goods and welfare, that Walzer 
recognizes, already shows that the needy and the worse off in our society can get help 
and necessary care. If this is so, why must we still stubbornly require the equal share 
of property, income, resources and egalitarian redistribution? I agree with Thomas 
Nagel that, 
"the elimination of misery, poverty, and disease are probably more 
important social goals than the achievement of economic equality,... 
Unless there is independent justification for equality, an equal 
career，attainment of positions of influence and authority, and other elements of the good life?" 
(Richard Ameson, 'Against Complex Equality', ibid., p. 234.) And he believes that "inequalities will 
be 'summed' across different goods, because the autonomous criteria of distribution will tend to favour 
the same individual in each sphere." (Ibid., p. 234.). 
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distribution is just as arbitrary from a moral point of view as any other 
(moral demands)"^^ 
How can we require the practice of such an egalitarian distribution without 
demanding some people to sacrifice some other values such as their self interests or 
their shared wish to free from domination? When encountering the conflict between 
literal equality and other values, how can we solve such a conflict? No good answer 
from Arneson is given to this question. 
D. Further Problems on Walzer's Complex Equality 
From the above discussions, we find that Arneson, as a literal egalitarian, makes 
little attempt to answer those difficulties found in the theory of literal equality and 
offers no good argument to argue successfully against Walzer's doctrine of "complex 
equality." Then, does this mean that Walzer's doctrine is unproblematic? No, I don't 
think so. For me, it is difficult for Walzer to answer a question like this: When there is 
a gain which benefits all citizens, but it meanwhile requires the state intervention of 
one sphere such as the market, then why shouldn't we allow this interference or why 
must we still limit the power of state within it sphere? Actually, in arguing against the 
simple equality, Walzer clearly expresses his fear of the tyranny of political power. 
As stated by Miller: "The reason is that [Walzer] is distrustful of political power, 
62 
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afraid that to allow the state to operate inside the spheres of justice would be to open 
the door to the simplest and worst form of tyranny. And one cause to develop the 
thesis of 'complex equality' is to restrain the use of political power. However, it is 
doubtful that political intervention in small degrees or in reasonable extent --- it will 
not be widespread --- will cause the tyrannical use of political power. Sometimes, in 
dealing with the sudden crisis or for the sake of social utility, political intervention is 
needed. Then why must we prohibit this intervention? Besides, if political 
intervention is helpful to the healthy development of the market system, then why 
must we prohibit this helpful intervention? Furthermore, the boundaries of distinct 
distributive spheres are susceptible to breach. To preserve whatever degree of 
integrity of the separate spheres is deemed desirable, state action is required. Then, 
why must we accept the assumption that the power to preserve the integrity of the 
separate spheres is less dangerous than that of intervention in a reasonable degree? 
David Miler also asks similar questions : "If money threatens to become a dominant 
good, why is it necessarily better to tackle the problem by strengthening the 
boundaries between the sphere of the market and the other spheres than by 
intervening in the market itself?"^^ I don't think Walzer can answer these questions 
63 David Miller, 'Introduction', in Pluralism, justice, and Equality, ed. by D. Miller and M. Walzer, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, p.14. 
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easily if he doesn't want to make any concession in his holding --- the doctrine of 
complex equality. 
Besides, though Walzer insists on the restraint of political power, he does not 
offer a clear and systematic account on what mechanism in our society can help us to 
restrain such power. What he merely says is: "Democracy is a way of allocating 
power and legitimating its use --- or better, it is the political way of allocating 
power.,，65 Though Walzer insists on the effect of democracy in restraining the 
political power in modem western societies, he doesn't worry about those democratic 
activities to be indirectly (or directly) under the influence of dominant class. Is 
democracy perfect enough to limit political power to work within its sphere without 
looking after the interests of the ruling class? I doubt this is possible especially in 
such a society where any activity of election needs large amount of money, which can 
only be provided by the economic dominant class. If the intellectual tools are 
controlled in hands of that economic ruling class, can democracy help to rule out the 
control of that ruling class? For example, they own TV station and publication center 
and control mass media, and also they financially support private universities and 
institute think-tanks. They can use all of these institutional channels to create ideology 
and advocate the ideas that serve their interests. Maybe the debate on TV and the 
65 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983，p. 304. 
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speech in an assembly have been already under their influence. If this is so, how can 
we restrain the domination of money? How can democracy help to restrain the use of 
political power to serve the interest of the economic ruling class in modem societies? 
In addition, what mechanism can we adopt to eliminate domination and 
undermine the existence of the dominant good in a society with no democracy? 
Holding the relativist position, Walzer is unwilling to say that a society with no 
democracy is unjust. According to Walzer, "[jJustice is relative to social meanings" 
and "[i]n a society where social meanings are integrated and hierarchical, justice will 
come to the aid of inequality (which is shared by people living in such a society). 
Now the question is: what mechanism can help preserve the integrity of the separate 
spheres to undermine the existence of a dominant good in such an undemocratic 
society, where social meanings are integrated and hierarchical? It seems that Walzer 
rarely offers any answer to this question. It is this question that makes me focus on 
Walzer's another controversial thesis on justice, 'social meanings of goods'. In two 
forthcoming chapters, I will try to give a detailed account on this thesis and hope, 
from this discussion, we can locate the major problems encountered by Walzer. 
66 Ibid., pp. 312-313. 
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Chapter Three: 
Social Meanings of Goods 
Perhaps the most controversial issue in Walzer's theory is the doctrine of 'social 
meaning of goods.' According to Walzer, a social good has social meanings, and we 
find our way to distributive justice through an interpretation of those meanings. 
Besides, when we understand what a social good is, what it means to those people for 
whom it is a good, we also understand how, by whom and for what reasons it ought to 
be distributed. So Walzer says, “All distributions are just or unjust relative to the 
social meaning of the goods at stake."^^ Therefore, before getting to know the 
followings: what kind of distribution is just, what criterion is appropriate, and where 
the boundaries of goods have to be set, we must first understand the social meanings 
of goods. 
A. Is Walzer's Theory Unnecessarily Restrictive? 
However, some critics think that Walzer's claim of 'social meanings of goods' is 
problematic. One problem concerns the relation between the social meaning of a good 
and its corresponding distributive principle. According to Walzer, the meaning of each 
67 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, p. 9. 
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social good determines its criterion of distribution. Once we know what we have to 
allocate, he argues, we also know how we should allocate it to whom and by what 
means. In the case of medical care, for instance, the distributive criterion is the 
principle of need; in the case of money and commodities (unneeded goods), it is the 
principle of free exchange in the market; in the case of education, it is equality at the 
basic level, and capacity to benefit at a higher level. Some, like Amy Gutmann, sees 
what Walzer claims here is a thesis of sphere-specificity, "the idea that each 
distributive sphere is constituted by principle internal to it, and those principles are in 
turn triggered by the social meanings of social goods." 
One argument these critics provide is that Walzer's theory is unnecessarily 
restrictive when Walzer requires that a social good must be distributed within its 
specific sphere. They usually take medical care as an example to argue that medical 
care needs not be treated as a needed good and its distribution needs not be limited to 
the sphere of welfare. As argued by Gutmann, once an adequate level of medical care 
is provided for all members, we have no reason to restrain people from buying more 
medical care with their income. This example reveals that the doctrine of complex 
equality fails to explain why justice is incompatible with a limited market in medical 
care. Thus Gutmann says, "[t]he sphere-specific answer triggered by complex equality 
68 Amy Gutmann, 'Justice across the Spheres', in Pluralism, justice, and Equality, ed. by D. Miller 
and M. Walzer, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, pp. 102-103. 
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—because medical care is not a commodity, it is unjust to buy it on the market --- is 
deeply misleading. 
Brian Barry offers a similar argument. According to Barry, Walzer fails to claim 
that the meaning of a good determines its right distribution. For example, in the case 
of medical care, Barry sees that it is not convincing to say that once the medical care 
becomes a needed good, it must be taken out of the market and should only be 
communally provided in accordance with the principle of need. He says, “I cannot see 
that [Walzer] can get there by saying that 'needed goods are not commodities'."^^ For 
him, food, clothing, and shelter (including heat and utilities) are even more basic 
needs, but Walzer has not said that these things should not be sold. Then why must the 
medical care be distributed restrictively within the sphere of need? 
In his "Response", Walzer rarely gives a direct reply to all above criticisms. He 
just says, “ 'Spheres' is a metaphor" and "[t]here isn't one social good to each sphere, 
11 
or one sphere for each good." It seems that Walzer never makes such a strong claim 
that the link between the meaning of a social good and its corresponding distributive 
principle must be a conceptual one. According to Walzer, the social meaning of a 
good mostly comes from the social construction, not from its intrinsic nature; besides, 
69 Ibid., p. 116. 
7° Brian Barry, 'Spherical Justice and Global Injustice', in Pluralism, justice, and Equality, ed. by D. 
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the distributive principle of one social good may be suggested by the nature of this 
good, but is not entailed by He says, "[d]istributive criteria and arrangements are 
D 
intrinsic not to the good-in-itself but to the social good." For example, our 
perception (or the social meaning) of the table-that-is-an-alter not just comes from the 
nature of the table, but also comes from what we have made it for --_ its meaning is 
socially defined, and it is conceived and created through a social constructed process. 
Besides, it is possible that one good can be constructed in different ways under 
different conditions, and thus can derive different social meanings. Therefore, a table 
can become a desk, a workbench, a butcher's block, or an altar, and each of these can 
take on meanings to which the ‘mere’ table gives us no positive clue. Walzer clarifies 
this point with regard to food. He says, 
"Consider the easy example of food, which answers, as it were, to 
very different descriptions (from which different distributions follow) in 
a time of extreme scarcity and in time of plenty, or at one and the same 
time for very poor people and for affluent people. Hen soup kitchens and 
food stamps on the one hand and the grocery store on the other: need 
communally provided and commodities available on the market. 
Defenders of complex equality have no difficulty recognizing both."^ "^  
If we accept Walzer's explanation, we will see that Walzer's claim on social 
meanings of goods is not unnecessarily restrictive as what Gutmann and Barry put it 
to be. In response to Barry's criticism, Walzer can answer that he never treats needed 
72 See David Miller, 'Introduction', in Pluralism，justice, and Equality, ed. by D. Miller and M. 
Walzer, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, op.cit. 
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goods as commodities, but this does not mean that he insists that medical care in any 
condition must be the needed good and cannot be sold in market. Medical care, like 
food, when it is socially constructed in different ways, under different conditions, may 
derive different social meanings and will be distributed according to different 
principles. For example, cosmetic surgery (when considered as a luxury), and 
medicine in case of need, would require different principles; basic education and 
education for the professions may be distributed in accordance with different criteria. 
But once we conceive its special meaning through some particular social processes 
under some specific conditions, we know how to distribute it and this immediately 
triggers a particular distributive principle. For example, if our fellow citizens agree 
that when goods are publicly funded they should be available to all in proportion to 
need, then the medical care, as a good on which communal fund is spent, must be 
distributed according to need. However, when medical care is not publicly funded, or 
when it is a luxury, it needs not be distributed in accordance with the principle of need. 
So for Walzer, the social meaning of goods is social constructed and can be conceived 
in different ways, not just limited to its literal meaning. 
Similarly, Walzer may accept that when there is an extra amount of medical care, 
which is not publicly funded, this extra amount of provision can be treated as 
74 Michael Walzer, 'Response', in Pluralism, justice, and Equality, ed. by D. Miller and M. Walzer, 
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commodities or urmeeded goods. This extra amount of medical care is purchasable 
only if the sale is limited and does not distort the characteristic of medical care as a 
needed good^^ In holding this point of view, Walzer finds no difficulty in answering 
Gutmann's question: "Once an adequate level of medical care is provided for all 
members, why must we restrain people from buying more medical care with their 
income?" As he says in Spheres of Justice: 
"Needed goods are not commodities. Or, more precisely, they can 
be bought and sold only insofar as they are available above and beyond 
whatever level of provision is fixed by democratic decision making (and 
only insofar as the buying and selling doesn't distort distribution below 
that level).’’77 
However, Walzer's answer seems very vague when we consider the argument about 
the level of communal care. Dworkin argues that the acceptance of communal 
provision "does not require that the poor be provided the same medical care the rich 
are able to buy" and "even those who agree that some medical care must be provided 
for everyone disagree about limit." There is an argument on how much communal 
fund should be spent on the medical care and what level of the medical care should be 
treated as the communal need. Dworkin believes that this is the most basic problem a 
theory of justice has to answer. However, in his work, Walzer seems not to treat this 
75 From Hon-Lam Li's paper on Michael Walzer. 
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problem seriously and hence leaves some problems unsolved in his theory. 
B. Social Meanings of Goods and Moral Considerations 
Another problem concerning Walzer's theory of justice arises mainly from its 
insistence on the social meanings of goods. According to Gutmann, in some cases, the 
social meaning of a good does not generate the most appropriate distributive principle. 
Many relevant moral considerations, which are not specific to a sphere and are not 
derived from the meaning of any good, will cut across distributed spheres and gain 
moral force in the context of justice. Individual responsibility is one of these moral 
considerations. In the case of medical care, for instance, need is not the only morally 
relevant consideration in its distribution, we have to consider people's responsibility 
for their voluntary action. According to Gutmann, it seems acceptable for us that it is 
not unjust to constrain access to medical care by making it more costly to people who 
voluntarily take unnecessary risk with their health. ^ ^ In addition, it seems that 
personal morality is also relevant to the consideration of the way to distribute medical 
resources at the time of scarcity. For instance, because of scarcity, we must decide 
between saving one of the two patients who are dying of liver failure. The first one is 
a normal patient, who has tried his best to avoid any risk to his health, whereas the 
79 Detail see Amy Gutmann's 'Justice across the Spheres'，in Pluralism, justice, and Equality, ed. by 
D. Miller and M. Walzer, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, pp. 111-9. 
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second one is an alcoholic, who has been warned repeatedly by the hospital against 
drinking. It is obvious that we should save the first patient because the second one is 
responsible for his own predicament.^^ However, if we really accept this, what we do 
"would be to go beyond the sphere-specific principle of distributing health care 
according to need and to recognize that need is not the only morally relevant 
consideration in distributing health care."^^ In other words, if we accept that moral 
considerations are relevant in considering just or unjust distribution, we have to give 
up Walzer's claim that distributive justice is only determined by the social meaning of 
goods. 
In response to Gutmann's challenge, Walzer regards that moral considerations 
may sometimes affect our decision in distributing good, but this doesn't mean that 
they can serve as the general principle of distribution. For Walzer, when one good is 
socially created, valued and conceived and its social meaning is established, all those 
impartial moral considerations such as fairness, individual responsibility, and 
personal morality are rarely taken into account. Moral considerations can only play a 
mediated and indirect part in making distributive decisions in some special cases. 
Here, Walzer seems to regard that moral consideration or personal morality does 
sometimes have their influence on distribution. However, for Walzer, this kind of 
I cite this example from Professor Li Hon-Lam's paper on Michael Walzer. 
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influence usually functions not at the time of distributing, but after it. For example, 
when a doctor, who clearly understands that medical care is a needed good, 
encounters an irresponsible patient and knows that the patient's trouble is caused by 
the patient himself/herself, what he has to do is to provide the best treatment to that 
patient and should not refuse to give service to the patient. However, after the 
treatment, we can invite some measures to avoid such an improper or irresponsible 
behaviour. We can require that patient to pay higher treatment fee or higher insurance 
premiums. Then what are the reasons that supports us to ask that irresponsible patient 
to pay higher treatment fee? Here Walzer seems to concede that moral consideration 
as well as ordinary morality should be taken into account in shaping distributive 
principles. He seems to agree that moral considerations do have their influence in 
interpreting the meanings of social goods. However, as indicated by Gutmann, unlike 
social meanings, which are internal to the corresponding goods, moral considerations 
are not internal to any sphere but cut across distributive spheres. Then how do these 
boundary-crossing moralities work in the process of interpretation? Walzer rarely 
gives any response to this question. Walzer's discussion on the approach of 
interpretation, by which social meanings are obtained, is very vague. However, for me, 
if Walzer wants to save his theory from implausibility, he has to give a concrete 
81 Amy Gutmann, 'Justice across the Spheres' , m Pluralism, justice, and Equality, ed. by D. Miller 
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description on the influence of those moral considerations in interpreting the meaning 
of a social good. 
C. The Conflicting Social Meanings of A Good 
In addition, some critics see that the most problematic part in Walzer's theory is 
that it is unhelpful in solving the conflict of opposite social meanings of one good. 
Consider this question: When there exists one social good，which has multiple social 
meanings, and the multiple meanings sometimes conflict with each other, then how 
can we solve this conflict? For Gutmann, Walzer's theory is unable to offer a satisfied 
answer to this question. 
Take 'productive employment in today USA' as an example. Gutmann argues 
that this good owns more than one meaning, and different meanings yield conflicting 
distributive principles. On the one hand, when jobs are understood as careers open to 
talent, this understanding triggers a principle which claims that jobs must be 
distributed to the most qualified candidates through meritocratic or qualifying 
procedures. On the other hand, when job is understood to be a common precondition 
for the equal status of citizens, it triggers a principle of distributing jobs to all who 
need them. These two standards may not conflict with each other in a full 
employment economy. However, in an economy that falls far short of full 
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employment, these two standards would often conflict with each other. Then, which 
standard is morally best? According to Gutmann, Walzer's sphere-specific thesis, 
which insists that jobs are careers open to talent, is unhelpful in solving this problem. 
For her, we cannot answer this question by deciding what jobs really mean in our 
society. "That's the problem, not its r e so lu t i on .Fo r Gutmann, to solve this conflict, 
what we have to rely on is the moral consideration. As she says, 
"What complex equality characterizes as competing social 
meanings now looks more like a moral disagreement, and the moral 
disagreement enlists considerations that are not specific to the sphere of 
employment. ... [To] resolve the conflict, both must move beyond social 
meanings, and attend to moral arguments. Which policy entails the lesser 
83 
moral wrong?" 
As already mentioned above, Walzer never commits himself dogmatically to a 
restrictive view that distributive criteria must be intrinsic to social goods. He accepts 
that a social good, constructed in different ways, under different conditions can have 
different meanings, which then may yield different distributive standards. For 
example, in the case of education, basic education and education for the professions 
require different distributive principles. However, what Gutmann cares about is not 
the multiplicity of social meanings, but the conflict between two different social 
meanings of the same good. How can we solve this conflict? How do we know which 
of those conflicting distributive principles is the most appropriate principle commonly 
82 Amy Gutmann, 'Justice across the Spheres', in Pluralism, justice, and Equality, ed. by D. Miller 
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held in our society? Walzer's response seems to avoid the question more than reply to 
it, as he divides a good into sub-categories, like plastic surgery and medicine in case 
of need. Is it not possible that the same good has different or conflicting principles for 
distribution? For example, as stated by Miller, "You and I can agree about what 
education is — about what its value consist in — yet you may believe that access to 
education should be governed solely by pupils' ability, where I think it is all right for 
parents to buy better education for their children." 84 Then which idea should we 
take? 
One of Walzer's responses to above challenge is that he does not believe that the 
conflict mentioned above is unsolvable. Relying on the shared understandings in our 
society, Walzer sees that it is not difficult for us to find that some goods, like 
education and police protection, are partially communally provided, hence partially 
insulated from market c o n t r o l ^ In other words, Walzer regards that there are some 
goods, each of which may have different social meanings. For example, some goods, 
on the one hand, are needed goods; on the other hand, they are goods for sale. 
According to Walzer, despite their social meanings, as long as the distribution in 
accordance with one of these two social meanings does not interfere the distribution 
83 Ibid., p. 110. 
84 David Miller, "introduction", in Pluralism, Justice, and Equality, ed. by D. Miller and M. Walzer, 
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in accordance with another meaning, this distribution is not unjust. Therefore, in 
Walzer's view, as long as those par t ia l ly-communal -provided goods like medical care 
and basic education are adequately provided for all members, and distribution in 
market does not cause any subversion to these goods' other distributive criteria, it 
does not matter that these goods are sold in market. For example, in Walzer view, it is 
allowable that parents hire private tutors for their children or send them to private 
schools. He says, "[t]he market in services is subject to restraint only if it distorts the 
• • 8 6 
character, or lowers the value, of communal provision." 
Furthermore, for Walzer, even though we find that there is likely a conflict in 
between different distributive principles, we have to make sure whether this conflict is 
a real conflict. It is true that full employment is our ideal, but this does not mean that 
we must take job-is-distributed-to-the-need as the general principle to replace the 
principle that requires career be open to talent. In the process of hiring, what deserves 
our consideration is still applicants' qualification and ability, not his need. As said by 
Walzer, “no one has a right to a particular job for which it is necessary to qualify in 
• ” S7 
some way: 'job', differently conceived, must be both provided and merited." 
Besides, according to Walzer, sometimes we do find that there is a conflict 
85 Walzer gives an account on this point in Spheres of Justice, (Blackwell, Oxford, 1983), p. 102. As 
he says: "I should also note that some goods are partially provided, hence partially insulated from 
market control." 
86 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, p. 102. 
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between two different distributive principles, but this conflict is not a lasting one and 
can happen only in some exceptional cases. It is exceptional because this happening 
does not cause any change in the shared social meaning of a good and its 
corresponding principle. Taking productive employment as an example, Gutmann 
argues that sometimes we have to distribute jobs to members of historically 
disadvantaged such as blacks in the USA, but doing so will conflict with the general 
principle that career should be open to the talent. For Walzer, this case is only an 
exceptional case. He says, “As in any plausible moral argument, the claim that 
” 88 
distributions follow meanings is not absolute; it allows for reasonable exceptions." 
To understand what Walzer really wants to argue for, we must first make clear 
what the word "exception" really means. When Walzer says it is an exception, he is 
going to say that moral principles or moral considerations may affect people's 
judgement on how to distribute one social good. However, this does not mean that 
these moral principles have effect in altering the social meaning of this good. In 
general or normal situation, we must distribute goods in accordance with the general 
principle, yet in particular case, we may/may not — it is optional — put some moral 
principles into consideration. Nevertheless, this consideration does not mean that our 
distributive principles must be constituted by those moral considerations. For example, 
87 Michael Walzer, 'Response', in Pluralism, justice, and Equality, ed. by D. Miller and M. Walzer, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, p.282. 
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‘being punctual, is one of the rules that every member of a company must obey. The 
member who violates this rule will be punished. However, sometimes there is 
exception. When one provides reasons and excuses on why he is late, and such an 
excuse gets moral support, this member may (or may not) avoid punishment. This is 
an exceptional case. This exception happens only in a special case and this happening 
has not any power to subvert the rule of 'being punctual', which still functions in 
normal or general case. In the case of productive employment, Walzer sees that we 
should compensate the historical disadvantaged by satisfying their need for job in 
spite of their qualification. However, Walzer also sees this kind of distribution is just a 
temporary and exceptional arrangement. It will be turned back into normal 
arrangement in a short term and nothing will be changed in the field of jobs 
distributing. As stated by Walzer, 
“And the argument for complex equality, applied, let us say, to the 
American case (the case about productive employment), can account for 
affirmative action only as an exception to its principles. But that is 
exactly how the supporters of affirmative action describe it - as a 
necessary remedy for past injustice, a violation of the equal opportunity 
principle to make up for past violations, temporary in its operation. It is 
to be replaced as soon as possible by meritocratic or qualifying 
OQ 
procedures." 
However, the notion of exception reveals that sometimes we have to consider 
moral considerations in solving the conflict between two conflicting distributive 
88 Ibid., p. 283. 
89 Ibid. 
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principles. As mentioned before, Walzer seems to concede that taking moral 
considerations or personal morality into account is part of the work in interpreting the 
meaning of a social good. Nevertheless, as argued by Gutmann, many moral 
considerations, like personal responsibility, are not internal to any distributive sphere 
and may cut across different spheres. Therefore, Walzer seems to allow those 
boundary-crossing moral considerations to be taken in making interpretation on the 
shared social meanings of goods. However, in Spheres of Justice, there is no 
mentioning of taking moral consideration into account in those social processes the 
process of creation, conception, and valuation — in which the shared social meanings 
o f goods are r e a c h e d ， T h e n to what extent the personal morality and moral 
considerations exert their influence on our interpretation and what is the relation 
between them and the social meanings of goods? For me, it is impossible for Walzer 
to answer this challenge. One reason is that those boundary-crossing moral 
considerations are not something social and cultural in character. The social meaning 
of a good, which is interpreted under the influence of moral considerations, may differ 
or conflict with the social meaning, which is simply socially conceived, valued, and 
interpreted without the influence of moral considerations. I don't think Walzer's 
90 I derive this point form Professor Li Hon-Lam's paper on Michael Walzer. 
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thesis of interpretation can help sovle this conflict^ It is this insufficiency that has 
greatly weakened the convincing power of his theory. 
D. Other Problems 
There are still some problems about the social meanings of goods. As already 
mentioned in Chapter One, Walzer gives us the impression that given a social good, 
we can immediately understand its social meaning; and given its social meaning, we 
can easily read off the appropriate distributive principle. It seems that no problem can 
be found in this doctrine when we describe those goods like love, friendship, 
punishment, dialysis machine and Nobel prizes. However, we find it difficult to give 
an appropriate account on the social meanings of goods like “money” and “welfare.” 
Let's take money as an example. For Walzer, the correct way to distribute money is by 
means of the free exchange and the distribution of money should be limited within 
market. As he says, "[m]oney is both the measure of equivalence and the means of 
exchange; these are the proper functions of money and (ideally) its only functions. It 
is in the market that money does its work.”92 It seems that Walzer has misunderstood 
the nature and function of money when he treats money as a good only distributed in 
91 Walzer makes concession to Gutmann's argument because he wants to avoid the challenge that his 
d o = e 0 = ed social meanings of goods is unable to solve the problem of two confl^tmg shared 
卯ods However this concession leads him to encounter the problem of two 
wSn：：； detailed discussion on the problems concerning Walzer's view 
of interpretation in Chapter Five. 
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market. Money can be presented in different aspects and act as different goods. 
Sometimes it is presented as welfare, which is distributed in proportion to the needed; 
sometimes it is presented as scholarship or prize, which is distributed in accordance 
with the principle of desert. Then why must we limit its use in market? If my analysis 
of money is correct, it seems that there is at least one good, whose social meanings are 
not easily clarified in Walzer's formation. 
Furthermore, Walzer argues that the distribution of a good in accordance with its 
social meaning is a just distribution. Here Walzer seems to give "social meanings of 
goods" the normative power to judge what is just or what is unjust. But it is doubtful 
that social meanings of goods own such a normative function. Perhaps what we care 
is not whether the distribution of a good should be in accordance with its social 
meaning, but what brings about this social meaning. Perhaps what we really care is 
the justice of the source of the social meanings of goods. It is possible that the shared 
social meaning of a good is the result of power over communication. It may acts as an 
ideology to serve the interests of the ruling class. Then should we ground distributive 
justice on the social meaning with a problematic source? 
Take welfare as an example. Perhaps what we want to know is not whether we 
should distribute medical care in accordance with the principle of need or whether we 
^^Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, p. 104. 
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should treat medical care as a needed good, but whether we should have a welfare 
system. Once again, this account makes us recall Nozick's argument against patterned 
distributive principles.^^ For Nozick, continuous maintenance of literal equality, like 
redistribution of income by way of taxation or welfare benefits, would require some 
people such as the rich to sacrifice their gain and may frequently interfere their liberty. 
What we do here is to ignore the right of a giver. For example, taxing the rich is equal 
to forcing unemployed hippies to work for the benefit of the needy or forcing 
everyone to work five extra hours each week for the benefit of the needy. However, 
why must we accept this kind of rearrangement? Why must we accept law of 
redistribution of income, which forces the better off to work for the benefit of the 
needy? Why should we ignore the right of givers? What moral reasons justify our 
holding of the patterned principles of distributive justice, which is so 
r e c i p i e n t - o r i e n t e d ? Before going to say some goods are needed goods and must be 
distributed according to the principle of need, we first have to justify the existence of 
a welfare system. If it is unjust to keep a welfare system, it seems meaningless to say 
that the distribution of a welfare good according to the principle of need is just 
because no distribution of the welfare goods is justified. "Should we distribute the 
needed goods only in according with the principle of need?" is probably not the 
93 A detailed argument is find in Nozick's Anarchy, State, And Utopia, (Blackwell, 1974), pp. 155-64. 
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question we are concerned. Perhaps what we really care about are the questions: Who 
should bear the burden of a welfare society? And should we force them to bear such a 
burden? However, Walzer rarely gives any response to these questions. For him, when 
we share the social meanings of goods, we then have the obligation to distribute it in 
accordance with such shared understandings. Yet, it seems that this account is used to 
avoid the above questions more than to reply these questions. Nevertheless, as stated 
before, if Walzer wants to strengthen his argument, he has to give an explanation on 
the source of the shared social meanings of goods and prove the justice of this source. 
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Chapter Four: 
Shared Understandings and Moral Relativism 
A. Is Walzer A Conventionalist? 
Another controversial issue about Walzer's 'social meanings of goods' is the 
problem concerning 'shared understanding' or 'shared social meanings of goods.' In 
Spheres, Walzer not only emphasizes the importance of ‘social meanings of good' in 
distribution, but also insists that it must be shared. He says, "[a] given society is just if 
its substantive life is lived in a certain way - that is, in a way faithful to the shared 
understandings of the m e m b e r s，，9 4 Some critics, like Ronald Dworkin and Brian 
Barry, see what Walzer tries to advocate is conventionalism, which claims that justice 
is determined by conventions. They take Walzer's 'social meaning of goods" and 
"shared understanding" as something provided by conventions. 
According to Dworkin, what Walzer wants to develop is a theory that urges us 
to look to social conventions for discovering the appropriate principles of distribution 
for particular goods. And it is unjust when we don't respect the culture and 
convention of a community. In Walzer's opinion, “ [t]he adjective just, applied to this 
community (the ancient Indian village), . . . i t does not rule out the inequality of the 
94 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, pp. 312-313. 
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portions; it cannot require a radical redesign of the village against the shared 
understandings of the members."^^ In Dworkin's interpretation, Walzer seems to 
agree that a castle system is just in a society whose culture and convention accept it, 
and that it would be unjust in such a society to distribute goods and other resources 
equally. However, Dworkin thinks that this conventionalism is problematic. Are the 
conventions or the social meanings of goods really shared by all members of such a 
caste society? Are there no disagreements on these meanings? For Dworkin, every 
important issue on justice is a contest between competing models (or moral 
disagreements), but Walzer overlooks this and grounds moral judgement on people's 
"shared understandings" or conventions. Walzer's presupposition of the existence of a 
consensus on criteria of distribution, according to Dworkin, is unhelpful to solve the 
disagreements over the appropriate criterion of distribution. How can we expect that 
we can have shared understanding on the social meaning of a good if there are 
disagreements on the social meaning? To answer this question, Dworkin sees that 
what we have to do is to adopt a critical attitude towards those conflicting or 
controversial understandings, not to accept the most conventional one. He says, 
"justice is our critic not our mirror ... So a theory that ties justice to conventions 
95 ibid. 
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would not be acceptable even if it were available to us."^^ For Dworkin, if we accept 
Walzer's doctrine of 'shared understandings', we must presuppose that there are no 
disagreements on the meaning of social goods in our society. However, can we 
imagine that there are no disagreements and no controversy over the issue of justice in 
a society like ours? Indeed, in our society, there are lots of arguments about 
distributive justice, which are caused by disagreements on those distributive 
principles. For Dworkin, disagreements over the social meanings of goods and 
controversies over the issue of justice tell us that there is no shared social meaning to 
disagree about. 
Brian Barry offers a similar argument. He sees that what Walzer holds is not 
relativism, but conventionalism. In Berry's view, what Walzer advocates is the view 
that justice is determined for each society by the shared beliefs of the members of that 
society. And "[s]ince these meanings are socially defined, what is just is a matter of 
c o n v e n t i o n . ，， 9 7 In other words, those terms like 'shared understandings', 'shared 
ways of life' and 'social meanings of goods' are just expressions of the term, 
'conventions.' For Barry, what Walzer insists is that 'consent creates justice' and that 
to override these shared understandings is to act unjustly. However, can this kind of 
96 Ronald Dworkin, 'What Justice Isn't', in A Matter of Principle, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, p. 
219. 
97 Brian Barry, "Spherical Justice and Global Injustice", in Pluralism, justice, and Equality, ed. by D. 
Miller and M. Walzer, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, p.75. 
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justice be found in our society? Barry rejects this possibility. For him，how can we 
expect that we can reach an actual consent in such a society in which consent is 
invalidated by unequal access to the means of persuasion, or by lack of education and 
lack of opportunity for speculation about alternatives? Barry argues that this society is 
also the society we live and there is no actual consent or shared understandings that 
will be found in this unequal society. He says, "[c]onsent would still be suspected in a 
society of actual i n e q u a l i t y . ” 卯 Therefore, what Walzer advocates, according to Barry, 
is just those controversial conventional beliefs, which carry no normative power in 
moral judgement. 
Similarly, Arneson argues that if we accept conventional ideas to be the criteria 
of distribution, we will agree, "the distribution of honour and status under feudalism, 
which allows certain modes of domination of serfs and other vassals by lords, is 
culturally a p p r o v e d . ” 9 9 However, we all know that this kind of domination is unjust. 
For Arneson, Walzer also objects this domination in his doctrine of 'complex 
equality,' but his conventionalism seems to approve this domination to happen in 
other societies. Hence, Walzer's theory is one kind of conservatism that tries to avoid 
the pursuit of just criteria of distribution and limit the distribution to follow the 
existing shared ideologies or traditional conventions. 
9 8 i b i d . 
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All above criticisms show that Walzer's ‘shared social meanings of goods' is just 
an expression of the conventional beliefs and a grounding in these social conventions 
is not sufficient to give distributive standards moral authority. Does Walzer regard that 
he relies on the social conventions to establish his theory of justice? If not, Walzer has 
to provide a way to help us distinguish our shared understandings from the 
conventional ideas. 
Some, like David Miller, point out that Walzer does make a distinction between 
'social meanings of goods' and 'conventions.' If we want to understand the 
distinction, the first thing we have to do is to distinguish 'practices' from 'shared 
understandings' or 'shared opinions on practices.' As Miller says, “[t]he raw material 
of such an interpretation are the institutions and practices of a society on the one hand, 
and people's opinions about those institutions and practices on the other.,”��Then, 
what is the difference between ‘practices' and 'opinions or beliefs on these practices'? 
For Miller, practices, are to some extent a precipitate of past and present belief and are 
more stable than opinions. "Practices are always to some extent shaped by forms of 
power external to the distributive sphere in question, and this illegitimate shaping will 
be reflected in complaints and criticisms from those involved in the practice.”！。！ In 
99 Richard Ameson, 'Against Complex Equality', in Pluralism, justice, and Equality, ed. by D. Miller 
and M. Walzer, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, p. 237. 
�°David Miller, 'Introduction', in Pluralism, justice, and Equality, ed. by D. Miller and M. Walzer, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, p. 7. 
1 � Ibid. 
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Miller's view, we can understand 'practices' here as conventional ideas or beliefs. On 
the contrary, those complaints and criticisms reflect and shape people's shared beliefs 
or opinions on those practices. To depend only on practices, we have to deny justice 
its critical role, and we will encounter Dworkin's criticism that Walzer's theory just 
takes justice as our mirror, not our critic. Besides, grounding moral judgement on 
practices, we will encounter Barry and Arneson's challenge that we rely wrongly on 
controversial conventions or immoral shared ideologies to establish a normative 
theory. However, according to Miller, this is actually far from Walzer's intention. 
Walzer seems not to accept any kind of conventionalism and his theory is not a 
conservative one. For Miller, Walzer's radical view is explicitly expressed in his 
acceptance of the decentralized democratic socialism. As mentioned in Chapter One, 
Walzer believes that the appropriate arrangements in our society are those of a 
decentralized democratic socialism; a strong welfare state, a constrained market, an 
open and demystified civil service, independent public schools, workers' control of 
companies and factories, a politics of parties, movements, meetings, and public debate, 
and so on.^ ^^  These proposals are to different degrees radical when held up against 
contemporary conventional ideas and to some extent are not conventionally accepted 
in our society. Under this consideration, it seems that Walzer does not ground his 
102 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983，pp.318 
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theory of justice on the social conventions. Perhaps it is wrong or too quick for us to 
say Walzer's theory is one kind of conventionalism. 
However, to argue against the criticism that his theory has conservative 
implications, Walzer must look beyond practices to people's opinions about those 
practices. Walzer does say something on this. According to Walzer, the best 
understanding of the social meaning of a good comes from people's "deeper and 
inclusive accounts of our social life," not from our shallow and partisan accounts 而 
In other words, the social meanings of goods come from our 'deeper opinions' about 
those conventional practices, not just from the conventions or shallow accounts of our 
social life. However, the distinction between deep and shallow accounts of our social 
life is very unclear. What does the 'deep and inclusive accounts' really means and 
where does it come from? Why does this deep account or the shared social meaning 
of a good carry the normative power? What are the differences between the deep and 
shallow accounts? Besides, we also want to know what approach can help us mark off 
the deep account from shallow account and the way that brings us to grasp the real 
share among people. It seems that Walzer has to give more information to explain 
why his 'shared understandings' and 'shared social meanings of goods' are different 
from conventions. 
Walzer, 'Spheres of Justice: An Exchange', New York Review of Books, (July 21, 1983), 
p.44. 
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B. Equal Citizenship And Democracy 
David Miller tries to help Walzer respond to above challenges. He suggests that 
the most important requirement to understand the deep account — what people really 
share — and its normative power is that beliefs or opinions on practices should be 
coherent. This means that the set of shared beliefs or shared social meanings of goods 
"should have certain structure to it; in particular, opinions about specific issues should 
be derived from principles of a more general s o r t . ” ^ According to Walzer, the 
shared social meanings of goods reflect a general agreement and consensus, which is 
reached in the social constructions of goods/^^ For Miller, this 'consensus' is usually 
the shared holding of a more general moral principle, which can act as a guiding 
principle to help pick up the most appropriate social meaning of a good among those 
conflicting meanings. Understanding of such consensus — the principle of a more 
general sort — can help us put those shared social meanings of goods into a coherent 
account because all these meanings are under the guide of this general principle. 
Nonetheless, this general guiding principle is not a universal one because different 
societies may take different general principles as the guiding principle. In a 
democratic society like ours, for Miller, 'equal citizenship' is the basic consensus 
1 似 David Miller, 'Introduction', in Pluralism, justice, and Equality, ed. by D. Miller and M. Walzer, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, p. 9. 
1 仍 A detailed discussion in Walzer's 'Objectivity and Social Meaning', in The Quality of Life, (ed. By 
Martha C. Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993.) p. 167. 
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from which people's shared opinions on practice can be derived. Then what does 
'equal citizenship' really mean? According to Miller, citizenship is a social role, 
which to some extent can be defined in terms of rights. We cam classify these rights 
into three kinds: the protective rights, rights safeguarding the private freedom and 
security of each citizen against invasion by others; the political rights, rights to take 
part in decision-making in whatever political arenas the society in question provides; 
and welfare rights, rights guaranteeing a level of provision of goods and services that 
admits the citizen to full membership of his community/^^ So 'equal citizenship' 
means that all citizens in a society can enjoy these three kinds of rights equally. So in 
a democratic society or a society with equal citizenship as the central element of 
culture, “a coherent account of our beliefs about political power would include a 
commitment to industrial democracy" and "factories and firms should be subject to 
democratic control, primarily by those who work for them，，，even though this view, on 
the surface, is not widely held/o? According to Miller, Walzer would hold this view 
because holding it is coherent with the goal of equal citizenship, which demands the 
equal share of political rights. Similarly, we should recognize medical care as a 
needed good, not as a commodity, because this recognition will help to reinforce 
equal citizenship among people who may be highly unequal in the market sphere. 
106 David Miller, Market, State, And Community, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, p. 245. 
1G7 Ibid. 
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However, if we accept Miller's suggestion, we must assign ‘equal citizenship' a 
pivotal role within Walzer's theory of justice. This means that Walzer has to use equal 
citizenship as a guiding principle in case first-order criteria for distributing goods are 
in dispute. Then would Walzer accept such a general moral principle, the equal 
citizenship, which supplies those shared social meanings with moral authority in our 
society? As described himself as a pluralist, who holds historical and cultural 
particularism and objects to those universal and transcendental theories, I don't think 
Walzer will accept Miller's suggestion. In addition, if Walzer accepts Miller's 
suggestion, he has to answer the question about whether 'equal citizenship' is the only 
guiding principle or the unique focal point, which best renders our beliefs coherent. If 
another philosopher develops a counter theory, which shows that some other values, 
such as individual choice and social utility, are more fundamental than equal 
citizenship in our society, then how can Walzer reply to this challenge? Besides, it is 
possible that such three kinds of rights presupposed in the doctrine of equal 
citizenship might conflict with each other. If there is such a conflict, how can we 
solve it? If Walzer accepts Miller's suggestion to give 'equal citizenship' a pivotal 
role in his theory of justice, he has to answer all these questions. Besides, this view is 
also incompatible with his relativist theory of justice which claims that there is no "a 
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single decision point from which all distributions are controlled."^^^ However, if he 
does not accept Miller's suggestion, he must go back to answer those questions about 
"the shared social meanings of goods" mentioned in last section. 
Some like L.A. Downing and R.B. Thigpen try to help Walzer find out the best 
mechanism through which people can reach the most appropriate shared social 
meanings of goods. They suggest that the mechanism is democracy. They say, 
“[d]emocracy is the generally precondition, although not a guarantee, of a common 
life of shared u n d e r s t a n d i n g s . ， ， ^ In their views, it is only through the democratic 
procedure that citizens can know what they should choose and what they really share. 
However, does Walzer accept this suggestion? Though Downing and Thigpen try to 
defend Walzer's theory of justice, they don't think that Walzer will accept their 
suggestion. In their opinions, Walzer, in his relativistic position, is unwilling to say 
that every society ought to be democratic and will not agree that democracy is 
appropriate to societies with no democracy. As they stated, "[Walzer] does not want 
to argue that societies with undifferentiated spheres are necessarily u n j u s t . ” no 
According to Walzer, in different societies and epochs, the goods for distribution may 
be created, conceived, and valued through different social processes and mechanisms. 
108 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, p.4. 
io9l.A. Downing and R.B. Thigpen, "Beyond Shared Understandings", in Political theory, Vol.14, No3, 
Aug 1986，Sage Publications, Inc., p. 459. 
lie Ibid., p.458. 
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These goods are not limited to be conceived and valued under one way or one 
mechanism only. For example, Walzer doesn't think the medieval West or ancient 
India is an unjust society, even though we cannot find any democratic procedure 
adopted in that society. 
If Walzer does not accept above suggestions and refuses to involve his relativist 
position in a basic change, he has to answer the following questions: What are the 
differences between the "shared social meanings of goods" and conventional opinions? 
And when there are disagreements of the distribution of a good, can we say that there 
is a shared understanding of this good's social meaning? For me, Walzer's response to 
these questions might be found in his defence against those criticisms over his 
relativist position. Before going to discuss Walzer's probable response, let's first go to 
his moral relativism. 
C. Walzer's Benign Relativism 
As mentioned in Chapter One, Walzer holds a moral relativism, which is in 
opposition to those universal and transcendental theories. Moral relativism is 
commonly understood as the thesis that moral judgement and moral appraisal for 
actions are not just determined by a single set of comprehensive and universal moral 
principles, which are supposed to be appropriate for all human beings. Instead, moral 
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relativism claims that there are many moral standards, which are particular in 
character and are only available in relevant cases. In other words, moral judgements 
are not the judgements about what is right and wrong absolutely, but the judgements 
relative to "the particular standards that are made relevant by the context of the action 
in question, or by the context of the judgement itself.”工” 
However, moral relativism may bring about fear and resistance, especially when 
we hold it in a negative sense. Generally, as stated by Scanlon, "morality is seen as an 
important force for keeping people in line and for keeping the rest of us safe from 
potential wrongdoers." ^ ^^  However, it seems that the relativism, in its negative 
meaning, objects to such a morality. It gives us the impression that there is no moral 
standard for our behaviour to follow and this will undermine our confidence to do 
something which we believe is morally right and just. Relativism, in this negative use, 
is threatening and seems to justify the subjective immoral behaviour. However, this 
kind of relativism is not the relativism advocated by Walzer. What Walzer purposes to 
develop is a nonskeptical, positive, and normative relativism, or in Scanlon’s term, a 
‘benign relativism.' ^^ ^ Though this kind of relativism also denies the universal 
validity of any moral demand, it affirms the value of moral judgements in its 
川 T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 1998, p.329. 
112 ibid., 330. 
� T.M. Scanlon gives a brilliant account on the benign relativism in chapter eight of his book, What 
We Owe to Each Other, especially from page 333 to page 338. 
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particular form and tries to supply moral basis upon which we can clarify moral and 
immoral behaviours. According to the beign relativism, "the requirments of morality 
vary but are not for that reason to be taken less seriously."^^^ Walzer's theory of 
justice, as a benign relativism, claims that shared social meanings of goods are worthy 
of being taken seriously in distributive justice. In other words, Walzer grounds 
distributive justice on the various social meanings of goods. This is why he says, 
“[a]ll distribution are just or unjust relative to the social meanings of the goods at 
stake.”ii5 Holding this relativist position, Walzer claims that all moral principles are 
local, idiomatic, circumstantial, particularist, historical, and cultural in character. In 
other words, those relevant factors that we must take into account in considering the 
appropriate social meaning of a good are language, culture, tradition, history, and all 
relevant factual factors. So distributive justice must stand in some relation to the 
social goods, which are held in the lives of the people among whom they are 
distributed. For this reason, social meanings of goods are morally worthy of being 
taken seriously. 
This moral relativism raises some problems. Firstly, some, like Dworkin and 
Barry, may hold that this kind of relativism is a nondebunking version of the ‘social 
convention，，which ground distributive justice on the controversial conventions; and 
114 T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 1998, p. 333. 
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hence, it is merely another version of conventionalism. Besides, some others, like 
Scanlon, argue that it is possible that different people living in the same society may 
value their shared way of life differently. As stated by Scanlon, “[t]he fact that an 
action is required by standards that are part of a way of life may give those who value 
that way of life reason to perform it, but it does not guarantee that others have reason 
to accept the result."^^^ Unlike Dworkin and Barry, what Scanlon cares about is not 
whether we should ground distributive justice on conventions, but whether we should 
respect people's different options and listen to their disagreements. As there are 
disagreements over the social meanings of a good, it is difficult for us to decide which 
of them is the most appropriate meaning. For Scanlon, disagreements on the social 
meanings of goods lead us to doubt the moral authority of these meanings, and hence 
weaken the power of argument in Walzer's benign relativism. 
To give response to above challenges, Walzer first has to explain the term, 
'shared social meanings of goods' clearly. He must explain why those social 
meanings of goods are shared and clarify the differences between social meanings of 
goods and conventions. As mentioned in Chapter One, Walzer sees that the shared 
social meaning of a good reflects a consensus or represents a deep and inclusive 
account of our social life. But this account is still so unclear to respond to above 
� Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, p. 9. 
79 
questions. Now let's see what point Walzer can hold to argue against above 
challenges. For Walzer, as social goods are socially created, conceived, and valued, 
they have shared meanings. In the social process of creation, conception and valuation 
of a good, people may reach a consensus - a real agreement — which in turn 
determines the social meaning of the good and its corresponding distributive principle. 
As Walzer said, “[s]ocial constructions must reflect a general agreement. •.. The more 
complex and specific the construction the more surprising it is when a consensus is 
actually reached.，,“？ And as the social meaning of a good is reached on the basis of a 
general agreement, it is also shared. We must note that the general agreement 
mentioned here is different from the general moral guiding principle in Miller's 
suggestion. It merely represents one of those collective consciousnesses, which are 
reached in the social processes of creation, conception, and valuation. 
Take the distribution of pastoral care or medical care as an example. For Walzer, 
we cannot decide on the distribution of these two cares "until we understand the 
meanings of longevity and eternity in the lives of the people who are being cared 
f o r . ” 118 I n the medieval western countries, eternity or eternal life was widely accepted 
as a communal need. The social meaning of eternal life was derived from a socialized 
116 T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 1998，p. 337. 
117 Michael Walzer, 'Objectivity and Social Meaning', in The Quality of Life, ed. By Martha C. 
Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, p.l67. 
118 Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin, University of Notre Dame Press, 1994, p. 32. 
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consensus (or collective consciousness), which claimed that the cure of souls was 
public and the cure of bodies was private. However, in modem European countries, 
because of the advance of medical knowledge, the question on the reality of eternal 
life, and some changes in culture, the cure of bodies gradually becomes the socialized 
consensus and the cure of souls was being privatised. Under the influence of this new 
consensus, longevity or health, which is maintained by medical care, becomes the 
socially recognized need. Medical care, instead of pastoral care, becomes the needed 
good. From the medieval West to modem Western countries, there is a change in 
people's consensus and also the social meanings of goods. For Walzer, this change is 
gradual and takes a long period of time and it is difficult for us to observed the 
process of change. As he said, “[the goods'] principles and procedures will have been 
worked out over a long period of time through complex social interaction. ... The 
process as a whole is virtually impossible to reconstruct."^ ^ ^ 
Then how can Walzer respond to Scanlon's argument on disagreements? For 
Walzer, there are always arguments to be found in the social process in which the 
social meanings of a good is constructed and changed, but these arguments are rarely 
the arguments on people's consensus or collective beliefs. As stated by Walzer: 
"[People] may indeed disagree fiercely, but they are arguing within a 
world they share, where the range of social meanings is fairly narrow.... 
And, very often, distributive disputes take an even narrower form than this: 
119 Ibid., p. 21. 
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we find ourselves in agreement on the meaning of the disputed good and 
even on the principle of allocation that follows from that meaning, and we 
argue only about the application of the principle in these or those 
circumstance 
perhaps in Walzer's view, the term, "shared social meaning of a good" is just a 
metaphor and an account of it does not mean that such this social meaning must be 
approved by all members in a society. Sometimes, we may argue on the social 
meanings of goods, but this doesn't mean that there is nothing we shared in a socieity. 
people may indeed disagree fiercely, but they are arguing within a world they share 
and under the influence of different consensuses in relation to different social 
constructions of goods. Since the change of the consensus, like sea changes, is gradual 
and slow, the change of the shared social meanings of good is gradual too. This means 
that the shared social meanings of goods may pay lip service to the basic interest of all 
• 121 
its members and gain wide acceptance in a society for a significant length of time. 
In addition, as they are widely shared, these social meanings of goods are commonly 
accepted to be sources of moral authority. 
Then what is the distinction between the shared social meanings of goods and the 
conventions? It is possible for Walzer to answer like this: conventions are just some 
shallow and partian accounts of our social life; it may involve those ideas, or 
120 Ibid., p. 28. 
121 Scanlon also regards that Walzer can hold this point to defend his relativist position. See T.M. 
Scanlon's What We Owe to Each Other, (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
1998) pp. 337-338. 
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ideologies, which tend to help monopolize the dominant good owned by the ruling 
class. On the contrary, the shared social meanings of goods show us what is the 
approriate distribution of a good and how this distribution can help to diminish the 
power of dominant goods. Therefore, according to Walzer, "if [the] conventions were 
imposed by force, the mere idology of the ruling class, the idea of social meaning 
122 
might usefully be deployed in criticism of them." 
From what discussed above, it seems that Walzer can depend on his benign 
relativism to make response to those challenges on his thesis of "shared social 
meanings of goods." But for me, there are still some questions concern Walzer's view 
on people's consensus. First, what I find interesting is the sources of such consensus. 
How and where does such a consensus, like the widespread acceptance of the cure of 
soul in the medieval European countries, come from? Walzer's answer to this 
question is very vague. He just says, "[l]anguage, history, and culture come together 
to produce a collective c o n s c i o u s n e s s . ” ^ For Walzer, the consensus, which can tell 
us the appropriate social meanings of a good, consists of our language, history, culture, 
tradition and so on. Besides, this consensus can be found in the social construction of 
good or in those social process of creation, conception, and valuation. However, these 
accounts are more like a slogan than an explanation. They are some general 
122 Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin, University of Notre Dame Press, 1994, p. 29. 
123 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983，p. 28. 
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statements and the details are still unclear to us. How do those factors like language, 
history and culture come together to work out such a consensus? Instead of answering 
this qustion, Walzer tells us so quick that it is impossible for us to understand and 
reconstruct the process in which the consensus is reached. He says clearly: “The 
social processes that make this ( the reach of a consensus) possible are mixed 
processes, involving force and fraud, debate and consent, long period of habituation; 
overall, they remain mysterious," ^ ^^  and “[t]hc process as a whole is virtually 
impossible to reconst ruct .However , the response seems to avoid the questions 
more than give reply to them. It seems to Walzer that it does not matter for us to 
neglect the source of such a consensus. Nonetheless, in my view, it does matter for us. 
It is doubtful that in our society - the class society — real consensus can be found. 
Even though there was something approaching a consensus in a society, it may 
happen as the result of power over communication and function as prevailing 
ideology. Such a consensus is probably an unreal consensus. This view reminds me of 
Marx's ideas on ideology. According to Marx, no theories, except those scientific 
theories, can free ourselves from the mystification of ideologies in a class society. 
Then how can Walzer give reply to this challenge? Is his theory of justice a scientific 
theory? Besides, suppose we believe that social goods derive their shared social 
124 Michael Walzer, 'Objectivity and Social Meaning', in The Quality of Life, ed. By Martha C. 
Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, Clarendon Press, Oxford，1993, p. 167. 
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meanings of goods in the social processes or creation , conception, and valuation, 
then what approach can help us get access to such shared social meanings of goods. 
There are still problems concerning the method of interpretation. And I shall try to 
give a detailed discussion on Walzer's view of interpretation in next chapter. 




A. Walzer's Thesis of Interpretation 
In Spheres of Justice, Walzer holds that the correct way of doing philosophy "is 
126 
to interpret to one's fellow citizens the world of meanings that we share." However, 
in this book, he rarely mentions how social meanings are obtained by way of 
interpretation. In his later work on social criticism, Interpretation and Social 
Criticism, Walzer tries to give a demonstration on the approach of interpretation. For 
Walzer, the best interpretation is not the sum of all people's opinions or the result of a 
survey research. It is also not merely descriptive and explanatory in character. It is not 
barely an account of conventions. Walzer says, 
Interpretation does not commit us to a positivist reading of the 
actually existing morality, a description of moral facts as if they were 
immediately available to our understanding. . . . i n practice they (the 
moral facts) have to be read, rendered, construed, glossed, elucidated, 
127 
and not merely described. 
According to Walzer, the understanding comes from interpretation is a product of 
reading, glossing, elucidating, and constructing. Besides, Walzer believes that the best 
interpretation, just like the best reading of poem, can help express the ideas derived 
from it in a more powerful an persuasive way. This means that interpretation not only 
126 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, p.xiv. 
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tells us the fact — what we are sharing, but also tells us what we should do …how 
we can make a just distribution. Then what kind of job should a political philosopher, 
as an interpreter, take in order to get access to the shared social meanings of goods? 
For Walzer, the work of a philosopher in interpretation is similar to the work of a 
lawyer or a member of the judicial branch. What lawyers and judges have to do is to 
find meaning or the appropriate explanation in a morass of conflicting laws. Similarly, 
what moral and political philosophers have to do is to find the most appropriate 
shared social meanings of goods in a morass of existing conflicting social meanings 
or existing moralities. ^^ ^ Lawyers and judges make their legal judgement with 
reference to a particular body of laws or to a particular constitutional text. Similarly, 
political philosophers can ground distributive justice on the shared social meanings of 
goods. As the work of interpretation can help us to read off the best shared social 
meaning of a good or the deep and inclusive account of our social life, it can tell us 
what kind of distribution of such a good is just or unjust; hence, it can help ground the 
moral judgement on the shared social meanings of goods. 
However, for me, this account of interpretation is problematic. Sometimes, 
Walzer seems to assume that as social meanings of goods are shared, they are so 
127 Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1987, 
p. 29. 
128 As he says, "an interpretation is a judgement, the proper work of the judicial branch," and "[mjoral 
argument ... is interpretive in character, closely resembling the work of a lawyer of judge who 
struggles to find meaning in morass of conflicting laws and precedents." (Ibid., p. 20.) 
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obvious to us that we find no difficulties in knowing what they really are. As stated by 
Professor Li Hon-Lam, 
"Walzer sometimes gives the reader the impression that given a social 
good, we can come to comprehend it social meaning. And given its social 
meaning, we can read off the appropriate distributive principle without much 
difficulty. ... Given a dialysis machine, we know it should be distributive 
according to the principle of need. Nobel prizes should obviously be 
distributed according to desert. And the correct way to distribute money and 
” 129 
commodities is by means of the free exchange." 
This approach of describing the shared social meanings of goods is frequently 
presented in his Spheres of Justice)说 As the social meanings of goods are shared and 
obvious, and reflect people's consensus, we find no difficulties in understanding them 
and grounding distributive justice on them. However, in his later writings on morality 
and justice, Walzer seems to change his view on the nature of the shared social 
meanings of goods and the interpretation on these meanings. For him, as mentioned 
above, interpretation is not merely a description of moral fact, but also a way of 
rendering, glossing, elucidating, constructing and comparing. In his response to 
Dworkin，s criticism, he holds that the process of interpretation can help to "mark off 
better from worse argument, deep and inclusive accounts of our social life from 
129 Li Hon-Lam, "Michael Walzer". 
130 In Spheres of Justice, Walzer usually assumes that it is not difficult for us to know the social 
meanings and distributive criteria of some social goods like money, ecclesiastical office, punishment, 
job and so on. In this book, he always goes straightforward to express the social meanings of above 
goods without giving any explanation on how these social meanings are derived. Walzer seems to hold 
that the shard social meanings of goods are so obvious and easy to be understood. 
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shallow and partisan a c c o u n t s . ” � In Interpretation And Social Criticisms, he claims 
that reading shared moralities is like reading poem; this reading can help express the 
objects of interpretation "in a more powerful and persuasive way” and “will 
sometimes confirm and sometimes challenge received o p i n i o n . ” i 3 2 in addition, in his 
recent response to Amy Gutmann's criticism on his ignorance of the power of 
ordinary morality, Walzer seems to concede that taking boundary-crossing moral 
considerations into account is part of the work of interpretation. All of these seem to 
imply that the social meaning of a good is not obvious for us and cannot be known 
immediately. It has to be found through a process of interpretation and what we can 
do is to present our interpretation in a persuasive way. As he says, "interpretations are 
only more or less persuasive and illuminating." ^^ ^ And in the process of 
interpretations, lots of social, cultural, traditional, and historical factors, or even 
personal morality must be put into c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 134 Walzer seems to make a shift in 
his holding that social meanings of goods are obviously shared by us to another 
holding that social meanings of goods are only more or less persuasive illuminated 
through interpretation. However, holding this new position encounters another 
131 Michael Walzer, 'Spheres of Justice: An Exchange', New York Review of Books, (July 21, 1983)， 
p.44 
132 Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1987, 
p. 30 
133 Michael Walzer, "Objectivity and Social Meaning", in The Quality of Life, ed. by Martha C. 
Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, p.l72. 
134 As he says, "it is a good thing if the interpreter is able to tell a story, making his critical argument 
from within a tradition, acknowledging the significance of historical events and proper names even as 
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problem. As the social meanings are deep accounts of our social life and are not 
obvious for us, can we make a correct interpretation on them? Even though our 
illumination on the social meanings of goods is persuasive, it is possible that they are 
mistaken in our interpretation. It is possible that different people in one society hold 
different or conflicting interpretation on the social meanings of goods. How can we 
make sure what we interpret is what people in a particular society really share? For 
example, Walzer sees that the appropriate arrangements in his society are a strong 
welfare state, a constrained market and worker's control of companies and factories, 
but some may disagree that these arrangements are in accordance with what we share 
in our society. Then, does Walzer's interpretation really express what Americans 
today really share? Walzer rarely gives any answer to above questions. He tells us that 
interpretation is the proper way of doing moral philosophy, but he does not tell us 
how we can interpret the shared social meanings of goods correctly and why the thing 
we interpret is what we share. This insufficiency, for me, greatly diminishes the 
convincing power of his theory of justice, which seems to presuppose what we 
interpret is identical to what we shared. 
Besides, let's consider the analogy between the work of judges and the work of 
political philosophers. Before making a judgement, what judges have relied on are 
he reaches for the appropriate theoretical terms." {Thick and Thin, Notre Same, University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1994，p.50.) 
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laws or legal morass. Similarly, before making moral judgement on distribution, what 
political philosophers have depended on is the existing morality or the shared social 
meaning of a good. Good interpretation leads judges to make persuasive judgement; 
similarly, good interpretation on social meanings of goods leads philosophers to make 
persuasive account on just distribution. However, it seems to me that there is a basic 
difference between the laws or legal context in judge's interpretation and the shared 
social meanings of goods in philosopher's interpretation. This difference is found in 
the source of making laws and the source of giving meanings to social goods. It seems 
not difficult for us to understand how and from where a law was made. It is worked 
out through a legislative procedure, which is obvious for us. For example, in Hong 
Kong, proposed law (a bill) has to be first introduced into the Legislative Council 
where it is read three times, discussed, perhaps amended, and, if agreed to, passed; it 
is then normally signed by the Chief Executive and brought into operation as part of 
the law of Hong Kong. We find no difficulty in understanding the history of a law and 
the process in which this law has been made. It is not difficult for us to make 
reference to the source of making of a law when there is a conflict between two 
different interpretations on this law. However, it is not easy for us to give an account 
on the sources of construction of the social meanings of goods. Walzer rarely gives 
any detailed explanation on the processes in which social goods derive their meanings. 
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For Walzer, social goods derive their social meanings in the social processes of 
creation, conception, and valuation and are the products of language, history, and 
c u l t u r e . 135 However, this account does not explain clearly how those factors like 
language, history and culture join together to work out the shared social meanings of 
goods in the social processes of creation, conception and valuation. Walzer doesn't 
give any systematic explanation on the construction of social meanings of goods 
because he believes that it is impossible for us give such an explanation. As he says, 
"Social construction must reflect a general agreement — or, better, 
since no vote is ever taken, there must be a consensus. ... The more 
complex and specific the construction the more surprising it is when a 
consensus is actually reached. The social processes that make this possible 
are mixed processes, involving force and fraud, debate and consent, long 
period of habituation; overall, they remain mysterious."^^^ 
And also, 
“ [Moral principles] will have been worked out over a long period of 
time through complex social interaction. ... The process as a whole is 
137 
virtually impossible to reconstruct." 
If the social processes in which social goods derive their meanings are mysterious and 
may involve force, coercion and fraud, why must we ground distributive justice on 
social meanings which are probably the product of this unjust source? It seems that if 
As he says, "[sjocial meanings are constructions of objects by sets of subjects, ... Social 
construction must reflect a general agreement — or, better, since no vote is ever taken, there must be a 
consensus." ("Objectivity and Social Meaning", in The Quality of Life, ed. by Martha C. Nussbaum 
and Amartya Sen, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, p.l66 -167) And also, "[l]anguage, history, and 
culture come together to produce a collective consciousness." {Spheres of Justice, Blackwell, Oxford, 
1983, p. 28.) 
136 Michael Walzer, "Objectivity and Social Meaning", in The Quality of Life, ed. by Martha C. 
Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, p. 167. 
137 Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin, Notre Same, University of Notre Dame Press, 1994, p. 21. 
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Walzer wants to ground distributive justice on shared social meanings of goods，he 
must first give a justification to the construction of social meanings of goods. To 
claim that the social processes of construction are mysterious is not only unable to 
give s u c h a justification, but also unhelpful to the establishment of an integrate thesis 
of interpretation. It seems to me that Marx's theory of history can help express the 
source of people's corrective consciousness, but as this theoy is mainly descriptive 
and explanatory in character, it is unhelpful to the establishment of a normative theory 
of justice 
B. Walzer and Marx 
As mentioned in Chapter Four, the problem concerning Walzer's view about real 
consensus reminds me of Marx's ideas about ideology. It seems to me that Marx's 
theory of history can help explain the source of people's collective consensus. Besides, 
it seems possible that we can make reference to Marx's theory of history to work out a 
concrete doctrine of interpretation. Actually, if we read Walzer's writings carefully, 
we will find that Walzer cites lots from Marx. His view on the distributive struggle 
parallels Marx's theory of class struggle. His objection to tyranny or domination is 
similar to Marx's view of human emancipation from exploitation and dominance. And 
his criticism on simple equality seems to agree with Marx's criticism of equal right in 
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the "Critique of the Gotha Program." Both of them dislike the universal and 
transcendental moral theories. And also, Walzer's socialist position and his criticism 
on capitalism show that he holds a position close to Marx. However, as a whole, 
Walzer is not a Marxist. There are some fundamental differences found in their view 
about justice. 
Before going to discuss their differences, let's first understand Marx's theory of 
history or historical materialism briefly. According to Marx, history is divided into 
epochs, and each of them is characterized fundamentally by its mode of production, 
which in turn is determined by the productive powers, or productive force of society. 
A mode of production consists of a set of social relations of production, a system of 
economic role assigning effective control over the means, processes and fruits of 
social production to the occupants of some roles and excluding the occupants of other 
roles. 138 The former is the ruling class and the latter is the subordinated class. For 
Marx and Engels, the 'ruling ideas' in every epoch are the ideas of the ruling class, 
but these ideas are nothing but illusion, or in Marx's word, 'ideology.' On Marx's 
view, as long as we live in class society, we cannot be free from the influence of 
ruling ideas or ideology. It is only in a classless society that we can be freed from the 
mystification of morality and other ideologies. For Marx, there are no universal 
Detail see Allen Wood, "Marx Against Morality", inA Companion To Ethics, ed. By Peter Singer, 
Blackwell, 1993, pp.512-13. 
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interests, no cause of humanity in general in a society based on class oppression and 
torn by class conflict. In such a society, impartiality or a normative moral point of 
view is just an illusion. Therefore, any attempt to develop an impartial or a normative 
moral theory in such a society is just an attempt to universalise the ideas and interests 
of the ruling class. 
In his theory of history, Marx gives an explanation on the source of people's 
collective consciousness. What he tries to work out is a descriptive or explanatory 
theory of interpretation, not a normative one. Taking this into account, we may find 
some differences in Marx and Walzer's theories. According to Walzer, as discussed in 
Chapter One, the distribution in accordance with the social meaning of a good is an 
autonomous and just distribution. We must note that here the term 'just' is used in 
normative sense. On the contrary, in Marx's theory of history, we can't find that any 
distribution can be regarded as autonomous distribution. All distributions and 
transactions, according to Marx, are determined by the mode of production. Besides, 
Marx distrusts any normative moral theory. For Marx, morality along with religion, 
philosophy and law are all ideologies and are designed to stabilize the control of 
ruling class, even though it may serve the basic interests of all classes. Here Marx just 
tries to provide a description on the nature of morality, not using it in a normative 
sense. 
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Then what is Marx's view on 'justice? Different answers are given to this 
question and some of them even conflict with each other. This conflict finally gives 
rise to a fierce d e b a t e . � 3 9 Actually, 'justice' in Marx's description is similar to those 
terms like morality, religion, and philosophy. The claim of justice is just an ideology. 
Richard Miller gives a good explanation on Marx's use of this term. He says, 
"If Marx use such terms [such as 'justice'], it is to refer to people's 
moral beliefs or to single out phenomena which those beliefs would 
force them to approve. ... [Marx] is no more acknowledging that 
institution really are just than, say, Freud acknowledging that demons 
really had existed when he claimed that demonic possession in the 
middle Ages was schizophrenia based on in infantile guilt and fear... . 
[Therefore], to say that justice exists as a property of basic institution 
seems now to be as unreasonable as saying that phlogiston exists while 
admitting that it plays no causal role in combustion." 
According to Marx, "justice" can refer to people's shared common beliefs within one 
particular society with particular tradition and culture and in a particular epoch. 
However, Marx never regards these shared beliefs as some general, universal, or 
impartial normative criteria that can help to solve all social inequalities and conflicts. 
Rather, in Marx's view, any expression about justice is an expression of the 
superstructural ideology that corresponds or appropriate to the prevailing mode of 
production. For Marx, there exist the shared beliefs of justice or the superstmctual 
ideologies because they have the function to stabilize or legitimate the mode of 
139 For me, Professor, Li Hon-Lam's article, 'The Relevance of Nagel to Marx and Morality', is a 
brilliant paper in discussing this debate and Marx's paradox view on justice and morality. 
140 Richard Miller, Analyzing Marx, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984, p. 79. 
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production. This is why in different epochs and different cultures, the meanings of 
justice are different. According to Marx, it is not how people see themselves at a 
given time but what their real social relations are, that provides the framework for 
structuring a belief of justice consonant with who they are. We must note that the term, 
‘justice，，discussed here is only a descriptive or explanatory term used in a theory of 
interpretation, not a normative term in a moral theory. This is also the basic difference 
between Marx and Walzer's view on justice. Walzer wants to establish a normative 
theory of justice, whereas Marx objects to such a construction. Above all, Marx's 
theory does explain the source and the nature of people's collective consensus, and 
this kind of explanation is hardly found in Walzer's theory. Perhaps, Walzer can get 
help from Marx's historical approach to develop a new and systematic explanation on 
the historical development of the social meanings of goods and people's consensus. 
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Conclusion 
"What is justice?" Socrates asked thousand years ago, and ever since, it has still 
been one of the core questions of socio-political thinking and moral philosophy. What 
is a just distribution and what society is a just society? What are the rights of the poor 
in our society? And how do we weigh the importance of individual rights and liberties 
against the public goods? All these issues are the different aspects of the question, 
“what is justice?" Unfortunately, it seems that no one can supply a perfect answer to 
this question. In modern western countries, it seems that the debate around this 
question is an endless one without solution. It is just like what Maclntyre has said, 
“the most striking feature of contemporary moral utterance is that so much of it is 
used to express disagreement; and the most striking feature of the debates in which 
these disagreement are expressed is their interminable character.”“丄 
Walzer in his celebrated book, Spheres of Justice, tries to answer this question by 
establishing a normative theory of justice, which unlike those universal and 
transcendental moral theories, is pluralistic and relativistic in character. Claiming that 
arguments for abstract universal principles are unhelpful to solving the problems of 
distributive justice, Walzer focuses on 'society' and goes deep to see what people in a 
� Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue, edition, Duckworth, London, 1985, p. 6. 
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particular society really share. For Walzer, even though there are disagreements and 
conflicts, these disagreements and conflicts just happen in a society which members 
have their share culture, tradition, history and the way of life. It is impossible for us to 
detach ourselves from the real world we live and our shared understandings to make 
any fruitful moral judgement.丨彳之 And as long as we can interpret to people's shared 
understandings of social meanings of goods, it is not difficult for us to know the 
proper way of distribution and free us from the endless debate of distributive justice 
on the luxurious and unrealistic level of philosophical speculation 
Walzer's view on justice presents some new and interesting ideas of distributive 
justice, but for me, some core ideas in his theory seem somewhat unclear and 
problematic. For example, as discussed in Chapter Two, the doctrine of complex 
equality is stipulated by Walzer to free a person from any domination and 
unreasonable intervention. However, to reach this ideal, we must give power to the 
state to preserve the integrity of the separate spheres. Walzer's theory lacks an 
explanation on why this power of preservation is not a power of intervention, or is 
less dangerous than the power of a reasonable intervention. Besides, the acceptance of 
the doctrine of complex equality relies on the acceptance on the doctrine of shared 
142 As stated by Walzer, "[w]hat we do when we argue is to give an account of the actually existing 
morality. That morality is authoritative for us because it is only by virtue of its existence that we exist 
as the moral beings we are." {Interpretation and Social Criticism, Harvard University Press, 1987, 
P.21.) 
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social meanings of goods. We cannot know the proper sphere of distribution and the 
distributive criterion of a good, only that we make sure of the social meanings of 
goods. However, as argued in Chapter Three and Four, his explanation on the "shared 
social meanings of goods" is sufficiently unclear. According to Walzer, there are a 
variety of social goods and different goods have their different social meanings. 
However, do these different social meanings of different goods have the same nature 
or characteristic? For instance, as mentioned in Chapter Three, the social meanings of 
love, punishment and prizes seem to some extent differ from the social meanings of 
job, money, and welfare. Walzer rarely makes any distinction on these different social 
meanings of goods. Besides, Walzer holds that it is impossible for us to reconstruct 
the complicate social processes in which social meanings of goods are made. Social 
meanings of goods, in Walzer's theory, "are widely separated in space and time" and 
"are not set in a meaningful historical frame."^ "^ ^ However, as argued in Chapter Five, 
to describe the naming of the social goods in a developmental progression and to 
justify the source of giving meaning is necessary if Walzer wants to establish a 
reliable thesis of interpretation which can help develop a relativist theory of justice. 
All these inadequate and unclear explanations greatly diminish the convincing power 
of Walzer's view on distributive justice. If Walzer wants to save his theory of 
143 Michael Rustin, Equality in Post-Modem Times, in Pluralism, justice, and Equality, ed. by D. 
Miller and M. Walzer, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, p. 22. 
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implausibility, he must involve it in a basic change. For me, Marx's theory of history 
is a good choice to help develop a systematic explanation on the historical 
development of people's collective consciousness and shared understandings, though 
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